The opinion
McGINLEY, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to that part of the majority’s opinion which affirms the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board’s (Board) reversal of the Workers’ Compensation Judge’s (WCJ) award of attorney’s fees for an unreasonable contest.
Section 111.11(a)(2) of the Special Rules of Administrative Practice and Procedure before the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, 34 Pa.Code § 111.11(a)(2), requires that an appeal to the Board substantially contain:
A statement for the particular grounds upon which the appeal is based, including reference to the specific findings of fact which are challenged and the errors of law which are alleged. General allegations which do not bring to the attention of the Board the issues decided are insufficient. (Emphasis added.)
Employer failed to object to any of the WCJ’s findings of fact, or conclusions of law, pertaining to the assessment of attorney’s fees in the notice to the Board. 1 Appeal from Judge’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, February 12, 1996; R.R. at 84a. Additionally, Employer’s request for supersedeas lacked any mention of the WCJ’s award of attorney’s fees. Petition for Supersedeas on Appeal, February 13, 1996, at 1-3; R.R. at 86a-88a. Pa.R.A.P. 1551(a) states that: “Review of quasijudicial orders shall be heard by the court on the record. No question shall be heard or considered by the court which was not raised before the government unit.” The record discloses no objection by Employer to the award of attorney fees until it was raised in its brief to the Board. Because Employer failed to properly preserve the issue of attorney fees in the *45 notice of appeal, Employer waived this issue. Lewistown Hospital v. Workmen’s Compensation Board (Kuhns), 683 A.2d 702 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996).
The majority relies on Mediq, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Steskal), 159 Pa.Cmwlth. 1 , 633 A.2d 651 (1993), which held that a claimant’s first-time request for attorney’s fees in a post-trial memorandum of law failed to preserve the issue. I believe the present case is distinguishable from Mediq. In Mediq, the claimant never requested attorney’s fees on the record, whereas here, Claimant presented a fee agreement and requested attorney’s fees at the first hearing. Notes of Testimony, January 12, 1995 at 16; R.R. at 30a.
Assuming arguendo, Employer preserved its attack on the assessment of attorney’s fees, the majority’s opinion overrules our previous decision in Blunt Ltd. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Riley), 654 A.2d 253 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1995). In Blunt, the claimant requested attorney’s fees for an unreasonable contest in his proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and order. This Court held the request was sufficient notice to the employer. Id. The factual scenario in Blunt is indistinguishable from this controversy.
Accordingly, I would affirm the Board’s order that Claimant’s son is not eligible for workers’ compensation benefits pursuant to Section 307(l)(a) of the Act, and uphold the WCJ’s award of attorney’s fees to Claimant.
. We note that in its appeal to the Board, Employer alleged error with regard to the WCJ’s Findings of Fact (F.F.), Nos. 34 and 35, Conclusions of Law (C.L.), Nos. 18 and 19, and Order Nos. 3 and 4. No objection was made to F.F., No. 37 (Claimant’s fee agreement), C.L., Nos. 22, 23 and 25 (WCJ's determination for awarding attorney fees), and Order No. 9 which provides:
9. Defendant [Employer] shall pay to claimant's counsel, Kenneth C. Meyers, Esquire, fees in an amount equal to 20% of the total of all benefits specified in paragraphs 3, 4, and 5, for a period from March 7, 1994, to December 5, 1995, together with the interest due thereon pursuant to Section 440 of the Act.
WCJ’s Decision at 9; R.R. at 14a.