explaining that “Tcjounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. Whether this duty has been satisfied is measured by reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that “Tcjounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. Whether this duty has been satisfied is measured by reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments”
- rejecting ineffective assistance claim related to penalty phase of capital trial and observing that “the presentation of evidence of limited mitigating value would have opened the door to powerful countervailing testimony that could have swayed the jury against defendant”
- finding evidence is "material" if there is a "reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different"
- concluding defense counsel's failure to investigate A-2945-23 23 or discover certain evidence was reasonable because it "was significantly affected by [defendant's] conduct" in "purposely hid[ing] information"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
COLEMAN, J.,
concurring.
The trial court found that defendant is competent and that he has voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to pursue post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 3:22. I continue to agree with the trial court, and would have declined to consider the *276 post-conviction relief application by the Public Defender, over defendant’s objections, for the reasons expressed in Martini III, supra, 144 N.J. at 618-27, 677 A.2d 1106 (Coleman, J., dissenting). I agree with the trial court’s determinations in both Martini III and Martini IV, supra, 148 N.J. at 455 , 690 A.2d 603 .
Now that the Court has permitted the post-conviction relief proceedings to be conducted, I agree with the conclusion reached in Chief Justice Poritz’s opinion that the trial court properly denied the post-conviction relief application. That conclusion and the reasoning advanced to support it are consistent with my views expressed in Martini III and Martini IV. I therefore concur in Chief Justice Poritz’s opinion and the Court’s judgment affirming the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief.
Justice GARIBALDI joins in this opinion.