the clear intent of the automatic approval statute was to "require expeditious disposition of appealsf,]” and the "fact that the 'decision' reached was inconclusive ... does nol serve to convert the Council's attempted action into 'inaction' "
How later courts described this case
- the clear intent of the automatic approval statute was to "require expeditious disposition of appealsf,]” and the "fact that the 'decision' reached was inconclusive ... does nol serve to convert the Council's attempted action into 'inaction' "
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
O’HERN, J.,
concurring.
I would have voted otherwise in this case but believe that a dissent would serve no purpose. It is more important that such a zoning issue be settled than that it continue to be unsettled in the hope that some future court might reverse course.
At the same time, today’s result should instill in us a sense of disquietude. It leaves the untidy consequence that a “no-decision" by a governing body on a zoning appeal is invested with the same presumption of regularity as is a reasoned decision of the zoning board.
This consequence runs counter to important policy values that we have perceived in the MLUL. In our recent cases, Medici v. BPR Co., 107 N.J. 1, 23 (1987), Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 485 (1987), and PRB Enterprises, Inc. v. South Brunswick Planning Bd., 105 N.J. 1, 8-9 (1987), we *204 have increasingly emphasized that planning, and not ad hoc decision-making, is the cornerstone of sound governmental policy in this area. See also Riggs v. Township of Long Beach, 109 N.J. 601, 619-22 (1988) (Handler, J., concurring) (heightened role of planning is part of MLUL process for establishing clearer standards for the evaluation of municipal land use regulation). Thus, in Medici, supra, we required “in addition to proof of special reasons, an enhanced quality of proof and clear and specific findings by the board of adjustment that the variance sought is not inconsistent with the intent and purpose of the master plan and zoning ordinance.” 107 N.J. at 21 . That heightened process of reasoned decision-making is absent when the governing body’s indecision is allowed to resolve a zoning appeal.
Nevertheless, I must recognize that the majority perceives another important policy that the Court must respect. The Legislature has allowed municipalities to provide for appeals to the governing body of grants of use variances. That zoning policy may be understood to require the applicant to persuade the governing body as well as the zoning board of the merits of its case.
I would judge the first policy to be paramount. Yet there are limits to what we can do with the words of a statute. Those practitioners and government officials who work daily in this field will undoubtedly be able to present to the Legislature a suitable plan to resolve these policy conflicts.
O’HERN, J., concurs in result.
For Affirmance — Chief Justice WILENTZ, and Justices, CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN — 7.
Opposed — None.