stating that although mere hunches on the part of an officer are insufficient to meet this burden, “a combination of innocent facts, when taken together, may warrant further investigation by the police officer.”
How later courts described this case
- stating that although mere hunches on the part of an officer are insufficient to meet this burden, “a combination of innocent facts, when taken together, may warrant further investigation by the police officer.”
- noting that, in Commonwealth v. Hicks, 434 Pa. 153, 253 A.2d 276 (1969) "this court embraced the reasonable suspicion exception to the warrant requirement [of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968),] ... and [s]ince Hicks, Pennsylvania courts have consistently followed Terry in stop and frisk cases, including those arising under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution"
- considering evidence Cook was in a “high crime area,” where the officer had “made numerous drug related arrests[,]” in concluding the officer had reasonable suspicion
- stating that circumstances which alone would be insufficient may combine to show reasonable -9- J. S06038/19 suspicion
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SAYLOR, Justice,
concurring.
I agree with the majority that the contraband abandoned by Appellant during his flight from police was properly recovered and admitted into evidence at trial. I write only to note my agreement with the logic of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 625-26 , 111 S.Ct. 1547, 1550 , 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991)(holding that a seizure did not occur until the police physically restrained a fleeing suspect), and of Mr. Justice Castille’s dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. Matos, 543 Pa. 449, 473 , 672 A.2d 769, 781 (1996)(Castille, J., dissenting)(stating that “[t]hat a person voluntarily chooses to flee from the ‘mere presence’ of a police officer should not immunize that person when he abandons contraband, weapons, or other evidence during the course of his flight and a police officer’s pursuit”). Thus, I believe that, in the absence of unlawful conduct on the part of the police, and even under the paradigm of a mere encounter, abandoned property, as such, should be subject to lawful recovery by the authorities.