stating that school personnel who observed principal’s sexually suggestive behavior with children “had an independent obligation to report directly to DYFS” and their “failure to do so, standing alone, was evidence of negligence”
How later courts described this case
- stating that school personnel who observed principal’s sexually suggestive behavior with children “had an independent obligation to report directly to DYFS” and their “failure to do so, standing alone, was evidence of negligence”
- noting, in a personal injury case, that "[a] plaintiff must present evidence that there is (1) `a reasonable probability that his injuries will impair his future earning capacity' and (2) `sufficient factual matter upon which the quantum of diminishment can reasonably be determined'" (quoting Coll, supra, 29 N.J. at 176, 148 A.2d 481)
- holding promulgating policies to report abuse and implementing training programs to ensure the effectiveness of said policies promotes the safety and welfare of children, and is consistent with a school's parens patriae role
- noting that the violation of an administrative regulation requiring school rooms to have unobstructed safety-vision panels was relevant evidence of negligent conduct, although it was not proof of negligence per se
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*288 COLEMAN, J.,
concurring in the judgment.
I concur in the judgment of the Court. I would not undertake to write the jury charge, but would instead refer the matter to the Civil Jury Charge Committee. An appropriate jury charge will eliminate the necessity of bifurcating the liability trial to determine fault and then determine the percentage of fault of the respective parties.
For affirmance in part/reversal in part/remandment—Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices COLEMAN, LONG, VERNIERO, LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI, and ALBIN—7.
Opposed—None.