―The right of survivorship attains further significance to the matter at issue because personal property held by a husband and wife does not become part of the probate estate for purposes of administration. Assets subject to the right of survivorship, such as the bond at issue, pass to the surviving spouse by operation of law and do not become part of the probate assets in the hands of the personal representative of the deceased spouse.‖
How later courts described this case
- ―The right of survivorship attains further significance to the matter at issue because personal property held by a husband and wife does not become part of the probate estate for purposes of administration. Assets subject to the right of survivorship, such as the bond at issue, pass to the surviving spouse by operation of law and do not become part of the probate assets in the hands of the personal representative of the deceased spouse.‖
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
OPINION ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
FRANK G. CLEMENT, Jr., J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court,
in which WILLIAM B. CAIN and PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, JJ., joined.
Since the filing of the opinion in this matter, the Appellees have filed a petition pursuant to Tenn. R.App. P. 39 for this Court to reconsider its opinion for the sole purpose of addressing an issue raised by the Appellees and not addressed in the opinion filed on April 30, 2007. 1 Having determined that we failed to address an issue that was properly raised by the Ap-pellees in their Brief, we grant the petition for the sole purpose of addressing the issue that was properly raised by not addressed in the opinion of this Court filed on April 30, 2007. The issue as stated in the Appellees’ Brief reads as follows:
W. Garnett Ladd, Sr. owned and was beneficiary of a life insurance policy on his son, W. Garnett Ladd, Jr., in the approximate amount of $200,000.00. W. Garnett Ladd, Sr. predeceased W. Gar-nett Ladd, Jr., who predeceased Gerda Price Ladd, his mother. Mrs. Ladd was successor beneficiary under such policy, and could have filed a claim for same, the Defendant, as Executor, could have filed a claim and W. Garnett Ladd, III, as Power of Attorney could have filed a claim on behalf of his grandmother. The Defendant failed to file a claim, failed to advise Mrs. Ladd of the result of the failure to file a claim, or disclaim under appropriate state and federal statutes. Further, the Defendant failed to advise W. Garnett Ladd, III, that he could file a claim or that he could file a disclaimer, nor did he advise the result of the result of [sic] such failure. The Defendant failed to ascertain the legal result of the failure to claim or disclaim, the result of which were for the proceeds of such policy to be in Mrs. Ladd’s estate on her death for tax purposes while the proceeds went to the estate of the Deceased son. This lack of action resulted in a $107,418.85 additional tax on the estate of Gerda Price Ladd. The Special Master and the Trial Court recognized the duties but failed to assign liability to the Defendant, which we respectfully contend was error.
Analysis
Each of the issues presented presumes that Robert C. Marks, in his capacity as attorney, assumed the duty to represent Mrs. Gerda Ladd to: (1) file a claim for her as the beneficiary of a life insurance policy on her son, W. Garnett Ladd, Jr.; (2) advise Mrs. Ladd of the result of the failure to file a claim, or disclaim under appropriate state and federal statutes; (3) advise W. Garnett Ladd, III, that he could file a claim or a disclaimer on her behalf as her attorney-in-fact; (4) advise W. Garnett Ladd, III, of the result of the failure to file a claim, or disclaim under appropriate state and federal statutes; and (5) ascertain the legal result of the failure to claim or disclaim, the result of which were for the proceeds of such policy to be in Mrs. Ladd’s estate on her death for tax purposes. The plaintiffs contend Marks had the duty to act and/or advise Mrs. Gerda Ladd or her attorney-in-fact, W. Garnett Ladd, III, and that his failure to act or *649 advise resulted in a $107,418.85 additional tax on the estate of his client, Mrs. Gerda Ladd. We have determined the evidence preponderates against a finding that Marks assumed the duties at issue and, therefore, he is not liable for any taxes assessed on the estate of Gerda Price Ladd.
Marks, as Co-Executor of the Estate of Garnett Ladd, Sr., did not have a duty to make a claim on the policy on the life of Garnett Ladd, Jr., or to advise the contingent beneficiaries of the life insurance policy concerning the tax ramifications of making a claim or disclaiming the beneficial interest under the policy. As the Special Master found, “the contingent beneficiary of the policy on the life of Garnett Ladd, Jr., was Mrs. Gerda Ladd,” not the Estate of Garnett Ladd, Sr. The Special Master also concluded that Marks, as Co-Executor of the estate of Garnett Ladd, Sr., “was not responsible for collecting the proceeds on Ladd, Jr.’s life payable to Gerda Ladd.” The Chancellor also made a finding that Mrs. Gerda Ladd was the beneficiary of the policy.
Because the Estate of Garnett Ladd, Sr., was not the beneficiary of the insurance policy, Marks, in his capacity as the Co-Executor of the Estate of Garnett Ladd Sr., owed no duty to collect the proceeds of the policy. See Estate of Doyle v. Hunt, 60 S.W.3d 838, 844-45 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001) (explaining the role of an executor with regard to the estate).
Therefore, the question becomes whether Marks, in his capacity as attorney for Mrs. Gerda Ladd, as distinguished from his capacity as Co-Executor of her husband’s estate, assumed the duty to advise Mrs. Ladd or her attorney-in-fact, Garnett Ladd, III, regarding the life insurance proceeds at issue, the option to claim or disclaim her beneficial interest, and/or the tax ramifications of doing one or the other or neither. We have concluded the evidence is insufficient to establish that Marks assumed any such duties.
The Special Master found that Marks served as Mrs. Ladd’s “personal attorney” and, upon this finding, concluded that Marks should have counseled her to collect the proceeds or to disclaim the proceeds, and that he failed to do so. The Chancellor made a finding that there was no evidence in the record “to establish any work as an attorney for Mrs. Ladd individually.” Little else appears in the record concerning whether Marks assumed a duty to counsel Mrs. Ladd concerning her beneficial interest in the policy at issue. 2
According to Marks, he served as Mrs. Ladd’s personal attorney during the pertinent time period at issue; however it is unclear in exactly what capacity he served. In order to determine the duties Marks assumed as the personal attorney for Mrs. Ladd, or stated otherwise, the duties assigned to Marks by Mrs. Ladd, we must look to the principle of law pertaining to the attorney-client relationship. The attorney-client relationship is based on contract. In re Ellis, 822 S.W.2d 602, 607 (Tenn.Ct.App.1991) (citing Fox v. Pollack, 181 Cal.App.3d 954 , 226 Cal.Rptr. 532, 534 (1986); York v. Stiefel, 109 Ill.App.3d 342 , 64 Ill.Dec. 888 , 440 N.E.2d 440, 445 (1982)). The rules that apply to the formation of contracts also apply to contracts for legal representation. In re Ellis, 822 S.W.2d at 607 (citing Hashemi v. Shack, 609 F.Supp. 391, 393 (S.D.N.Y. *650 1984); Security Bank v. Klicker, 142 Wis.2d 289 , 418 N.W.2d 27, 30 (1987)).
Employment of an attorney by a client for one purpose does not authorize the attorney to represent the client in new or unrelated proceedings. See In re Ellis, 822 S.W.2d at 607 (citing Greenlaw v. Pittit, 87 Tenn. 467, 474-75 , 11 S.W. 357, 359 (1889); see also Hart v. First Nat’l Bank, 690 S.W.2d 536, 538-39 (Tenn.Ct.App.1985)). Clients may also change or alter the scope of their attorney’s authority at any time during representation. In re Ellis, 822 S.W.2d at 607 (citations omitted). Thus, the existence and scope of a lawyer’s authority to represent a client depends on the manner in which a client retains a lawyer in a particular case, and whether the client changes or alters the scope of the attorney’s authority or representation. Id.
The record is ambiguous, at best, as to the scope of Marks’ representation of Mrs. Ladd as her attorney. Marks stated he served as “personal attorney for Mrs. Ladd” and that he accepted the attorney fees “arising from [his] personal consultations and communications with Mrs. Ladd.” This evidence, however, fails to establish an agreement by Marks to assume a duty to represent Mrs. Ladd with regard to the life insurance proceeds or the tax consequences of failing to claim or disclaim her beneficial interest. The evidence also fails to establish a delegation to Marks by Mrs. Ladd of the authority to serve as her attorney or counselor with regard to the life insurance proceeds or the tax consequences of failing to claim or disclaim her beneficial interest. In fact, the only direct evidence that pertains directly to the issue of the life insurance proceeds suggests that Marks was not authorized by Mrs. Ladd to advise her concerning these matters.
In Marks’ deposition we find the following exchange between counsel and Marks:
Q: Did you feel you had any duty whatsoever to push that claim?
A: It was Mrs. Ladd’s call to make as the beneficiary, she being the beneficiary after Sr. had died. She was the beneficiary at the time of the insured life because Mr.— her husband had predeceased his son.
Q: Did you investigate what would happen to the policy if she did not file a claim?
A: No, Sir.
Q: So you obviously—
A: I took it to her. I showed it to her. I went over it. She said she did not want to make a claim.
Q: And did you tell her where the policy— where the proceeds would go if she didn’t?
A: No, Sir.
Q: Did you make inquiry to find out where they would go if she didn’t?
A: No, Sir. She cut me off on it.
Q: Sir?
A: She cut me off on it.
Q: What do you mean cut you off on it?
A: She says, “I don’t want any money out of them. I don’t want any money out of Sonny.” And just dismissed it. End of subject.
Counsel for the plaintiffs also questioned Marks regarding his authority with regard to multiple insurance policies; however, when questioned on the policy at issue, Marks was careful to clarify that Mrs. Ladd was the beneficiary, and thus, to claim or disclaim the proceeds was her decision, not his.
Appellees fail to cite to evidence in the record indicating that Marks was authorized by Mrs. Ladd to act as her attorney regarding the life insurance proceeds at *651 issue, and Marks has provided evidence directly indicating that she did not. As Marks testified, Mrs. Ladd “cut him off’ from pursuing the claim, and she did not want Marks to deal with the issue or discuss it with her.
Realizing that an attorney is not authorized to do anything a client would not have the attorney do, and may not engage in a course of action contrary to the client’s wishes, see 7A C.J.S. Attorney & Client § 233 (2004), the evidence in the record tells us that the scope of Marks’ representation was limited by Mrs. Ladd and did not include matters pertaining to the proceeds of the life insurance policy on her son, Garnett Ladd, Jr. Therefore, the plaintiffs’ contention that Marks is liable to the estate of Mrs. Gerda Ladd regarding the proceeds of the life insurance policy at issue and tax ramifications relating thereto is without merit.
In Conclusion
The opinion of this Court filed on April 30, 2007, is hereby reaffirmed in all respects except for and to the limited extent expressly stated herein.
This matter is remanded to the trial court, and costs associated with the Appel-lees’ petition to reconsider are assessed against the Appellees.
. The pleading filed by Appellees was identified by Appellees as a "motion'' to reconsider pursuant to Tenn. R.App. P. 39. The rules do not provide for a motion to reconsider. Therefore, we are treating the matter as a Petition for Rehearing pursuant to Tenn. R.App. P. 39.
. The Special Master and Chancellor both concluded that Marks rendered little, if any, services to or for Mrs. Ladd and, therefore, concluded that he must refund all of the fees paid to him by Mrs. Ladd.