concluding that a sentence only ceases to operate after “a discretionary decision on the part of the Board that the person actually would have been released to parole but for the second sentence”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that a sentence only ceases to operate after “a discretionary decision on the part of the Board that the person actually would have been released to parole but for the second sentence”
- stating that purpose of art. 42.08(b) was to mandate consecutive rather than concurrent sentences for inmate offenses
- declining to adopt a proposed construction of a section of the Code of Criminal Procedure when that construction would place the section in conflict with other laws
- finding defendant was not erroneously released and therefore not entitled to time credit for time on parole
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Ex Parte Hale, 2003 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 537 (2003)
21 S.W.3d 264, 267 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Ex parte Hale, 117 S.W.3d 866
The opinion
WOMACK, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion.
In my view, a convicted person who seeks relief from an error in an administrative decision of the Department of Criminal Justice may not use the procedure in article 11.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which “establishes the procedures for an application for a writ of habeas corpus in which the applicant seeks relief from a felony judgment imposing a penalty other than death.” * See Ex parte Whiteside, 12 S.W.3d 819, 822 (Tex.Cr. App.2000) (Womack, J., concurring). Because this application does not seek relief from a judgment, I would dismiss it without prejudice to the applicant’s seeking relief through a proper procedure. I respectfully dissent.
. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07, § 1.