holding that an insurance-policy provision defining a motor vehicle to include a trailer designed for travel on public roads and subject to motor vehicle registration means that the trailer must meet both requirements to fit the definition
How later courts described this case
- holding that an insurance-policy provision defining a motor vehicle to include a trailer designed for travel on public roads and subject to motor vehicle registration means that the trailer must meet both requirements to fit the definition
- noting that when a phrase is conjunctive, it requires proof of both clauses
- “Provisions of an insurance policy are construed most strongly against the insurance company, which prepared it.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Karen R. Baker, Judge, concurring. I agree with the majority that we must reverse and remand the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in this case. I also agree that the construction and legal effect of a written contract are matters to be determined by the court. Smith v. Prudential Property and Casualty Insur. Co., 340 Ark. 335 , 10 S.W.3d 846 (2000). Moreover, where the meaning of a contract does not depend on disputed extrinsic evidence, the construction and legal effect of the policy are questions of law. Tunnel v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co., 80 Ark. App. 215 , 95 S.W.3d 1 (2003). Here, the primary issue does not involve a question of fact concerning the camper trailer, but rather the construction and legal effect of the terms of the insurance policy, specifically the meaning of the term “subject to registration” and whether under the undisputed facts the camper trailer was subject to registration. See e.g., Nichols v. Farmers Ins. Co., 83 Ark. App. 324 , 128 S.W.3d 1 (2003).
The facts regarding the camper trailer are not in dispute. Therefore, determining whether the trailer was “subject to registration” is a question of law. The majority is correct in concluding that the policy language does not clearly exclude liability coverage for the camper trailer. It was therefore the trial court’s duty to construe the policy language to find that the camper trailer was not subject to registration at the time of the accident. See Castaneda v. Progressive Insurance Classis Insur. Co., 357 Ark. 345 , 166 S.W.3d 556 (2004). Because the camper trailer was not subject to registration, the trial court erred not only in granting summary judgment to Farm Bureau, but also in denying the Smiths’ motion for summary judgment.
Accordingly, I concur.