Opinion

Medina v. State

  • 7 S.W.3d 633
  • 1999 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 108
  • 1999 WL 791567
Court
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
Filed
Oct 6, 1999
Status
Published
Author
Meyers
On the bench
Keller, McCormick, Mansfield, Price, Holland, Johnson, Keasler, Meyers, Womack
Cited by
556 cases

finding ―the following combined evidence was sufficient to permit a rational jury to infer that [the witness] was a party to the crime, and hence, raise[d] a fact issue as to [the witness’s] accomplice status: (1) [the witness’s] presence in the car with appellant when the crime occurred, (2) evidence that the crime was a gang-motivated crime, (3) [the witness’s] membership in the same gang as appellant, and (4) [the witness’s] efforts to cover up the crime‖

How later courts described this case

  • finding ―the following combined evidence was sufficient to permit a rational jury to infer that [the witness] was a party to the crime, and hence, raise[d] a fact issue as to [the witness’s] accomplice status: (1) [the witness’s] presence in the car with appellant when the crime occurred, (2) evidence that the crime was a gang-motivated crime, (3) [the witness’s] membership in the same gang as appellant, and (4) [the witness’s] efforts to cover up the crime‖
  • stating that for “knowing murders, the distinction between result of conduct and nature of conduct blurs because awareness of the result of the conduct necessarily entails awareness of the nature of the conduct as well. . . . To be aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to result in death, the actor must also be aware of the lethal nature of his conduct”
  • explaining that when the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction under at least one theory of the offense, the harmfulness of error in the charge is measured against the likelihood the jury’s verdict is based on a theory not affected by the erroneous parts of the charge
  • concluding defendant was not entitled to lesser-included offense instruction where evidence showed that defendant intentionally fired into crowd, and finding lack of intent to kill any particular person was insufficient to warrant instruction on lesser- included offense

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

MEYERS, J.,

concurs with note:

Under the specific facts of this particular case, I agree that the error presented in point of error ten, in misdefining “knowingly” was not egregious. However, I cannot agree that a “knowing murder” under Penal Code § 19.02(b)(1), which is defined by caselaw as a result of conduct offense, is also always by definition, a nature of conduct offense.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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