explaining that the court must determine whether the proposed adoption 10 satisfies the statutory requirements for adoption before it reaches the best interest inquiry
How later courts described this case
- explaining that the court must determine whether the proposed adoption 10 satisfies the statutory requirements for adoption before it reaches the best interest inquiry
- explaining that the court must determine whether the proposed adoption satisfies the statutory requirements for adoption before it reaches the best interest inquiry
- holding that the Wisconsin adoption statutes did not allow a third party to adopt the minor child of the third party's same-sex nonmarital partner
- noting that the court is “still bound by the statutory requirements for adoption” despite liberal construction provision
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JANINE P. GESKE, J.
(concurring). I join in the majority opinion because I believe that it correctly analyzes current Wisconsin law. Although the dissents accurately point out that sec. 48.01(2), Stats., directs us to liberally construe ch. 48 with "[t]he best interests of the child" in mind, we are still bound by the statutory requirements for adoption. Estate of Topel, 32 Wis. 2d 223, 229 , 145 N.W.2d 162 (1966). Those requirements are not met in this case.
I write separately only to encourage the Wisconsin legislature to revisit ch. 48 in light of all that is occur *520 ring with children in our society. The legislators, as representatives of the people of this state, have both the right and the responsibility to establish the requirements for a legal adoption, for custody, and for visitation. This court cannot play that role. We can only interpret the law, not rewrite it.
The purpose of ch. 48 is to provide for the best interests of the children. Fortunately, Angel lives in a home where she is loved and cared for. She currently has a happy, stable life. Many children are not as fortunate as she. We live in a time when many of our children are abused, neglected, and unloved. Many others live in dysfunctional families. These children, who do not have the benefit of adults who will nurture and lovingly discipline them, often become the angry criminals we see in our felony courts.
Hopefully our legislators will continue to work to advance the interests and protection of our children by listening to their constituents, reviewing our current laws, and debating the wisdom of statutory changes. Children cannot protect their own interests. The legislature can protect those interests by vigilantly overseeing the children's code and ensuring a statutory scheme that indeed provides for the best interests of our kids.
I respectfully disagree with Justice Bablitch's view, in his dissenting opinion, that the legislature, by virtue of the language of sec. 48.01, Stats., has transferred its constitutional responsibility of establishing the statutory criteria for adoption to the judicial branch. As the majority opinion points out, if the intent of the legislature were to allow judges to create the legislative requirements for adoption, we would not need the various adoption statutes we have. Majority op. at 506. Instead, the legislature has indeed specifi *521 cally set forth the requirements for adoption. We are bound to apply them. The circuit court correctly concluded that those requirements were not met in this case.