holding that the plaintiff's allegations that a village "intentionally demanded a 33-foot easement as a condition of connecting [the plaintiff's] property to the municipal water supply where the Village required only a 15-foot easement from other similarly situated property owners ..., quite apart from the Village's subjective motivation, are sufficient to state a claim for relief under traditional equal protection analysis.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that the plaintiff's allegations that a village "intentionally demanded a 33-foot easement as a condition of connecting [the plaintiff's] property to the municipal water supply where the Village required only a 15-foot easement from other similarly situated property owners ..., quite apart from the Village's subjective motivation, are sufficient to state a claim for relief under traditional equal protection analysis.”
- holding that a class-of-one plaintiff sufficiently alleged that she was “intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there [wa]s no rational basis for the difference in treatment” where the defendant for no apparent reason demanded far more from her than “similarly situated property owners” after her “successful lawsuit” against the defendant
- holding that homeowner could assert equal protection claim as class of one against Defendant municipality where Defendant intentionally demanded a 33-foot easement as a condition of connecting plaintiffs property to the municipal water supply where it required only a 15-foot easement from other similarly situated property owners
- holding that a plaintiff asserts a valid equal protection claim when he (i) is a member of a protected class and was treated differently from members of an unprotected class, or (ii) belongs to a “class of one” and was treated differently from others similarly situated without any rational basis for the difference in treatment
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Declined to follow by Scarbrough v. Morgan County Board of Education, 470 F.3d 250 (2006)
528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000), we decline to extend the fundamental rights analysis to classes of one.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Paul Scarbrough v. Morgan County Board Of Education, 470 F.3d 250 (2006)
While we recognize that some equal protection claims involve a "class of one," see Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000), we decline to extend the fundamental rights analysis to classes of one.
Distinguished by United States v. American Electric Power Service Corp., 258 F. Supp. 2d 804 (2003)
528 U.S. 562, 565, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000)), but those are clearly distinguishable from this case, not least because here the claim is being asserted as a defense to statutorily-authorized civil enforcement proceedings, being pursued primarily by the federal government, whom Defendants clearly could not sue for such an alleged civil rights violation.
The opinion
Per Curiam.
Respondent Grace Oleeh and her late husband Thaddeus asked petitioner Village of Willowbrook (Village) to connect their property to the municipal water supply. The Village at first conditioned the connection on the Olechs granting the Village a 33-foot easement. The Olechs objected, claiming that the Village only required a 15-foot easement from other property owners seeking access to the water supply. After a 3-month delay, the Village relented and agreed to provide water service with only a 15-foot easement.
Oleeh sued the Village, claiming that the Village’s demand of an additional 18-foot easement violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Oleeh asserted that the 33-foot easement demand was “irrational and wholly arbitrary”; that the Village’s demand was actually motivated by ill will resulting from the Olechs’ previous filing of an unrelated, successful lawsuit against the Village; and that the Village acted either with the intent to deprive Oleeh of her rights or in reckless disregard of her rights. App. 10, 12.
The District Court dismissed the lawsuit pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a cognizable claim under the Equal Protection Clause. Relying on Circuit precedent, the Court of Appeals for the Sev *564 enth Circuit reversed, holding that a plaintiff can allege an equal protection violation by asserting that state action was motivated solely by a “ ‘spiteful effort to “get” him for reasons wholly unrelated to any legitimate state objective.’” 160 F. 3d 386, 387 (1998) (quoting Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F. 3d 176, 180 (CA7 1995)). It determined that Olech’s complaint sufficiently alleged such a claim. 160 F. 3d, at 388 . We granted certiorari to determine whether the Equal Protection Clause gives rise to a cause of action on behalf of a “class of one” where the plaintiff did not allege membership in a class or group. * 527 U. S. 1067 (1999).
Our cases have recognized successful equal protection claims brought by a “class of one,” where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. See Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U. S. 441 (1923); Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Commission of Webster Cty., 488 U. S. 336 (1989). In so doing, we have explained that “‘[t]he purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the State’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents.’ ” Sioux City Bridge Co., supra, at 445 (quoting Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Township of Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350, 352 (1918)).
*565 That reasoning is applicable to this ease. Oleeh’s complaint can fairly be construed as alleging that the Village intentionally demanded a 33-foot easement as a condition of connecting her property to the municipal water supply where the Village required only a 15-foot easement from other similarly situated property owners. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 45-46 (1957). The complaint also alleged that the Village’s demand was “irrational and wholly arbitrary” and that the Village ultimately connected her property after receiving a clearly adequate 15-foot easement. These allegations, quite apart from the Village’s subjective motivation, are sufficient to state a claim for relief under traditional equal protection analysis. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, but do not reach the alternative theory of “subjective ill will” relied on by that court.
It is so ordered.
We note that the complaint in this case could be read to allege a class of five. In addition to Grace and Thaddeus Olech, their neighbors Rodney and Phyllis Zimmer and Howard Brinkman requested to be connected to the municipal water supply, and the Village initially demanded the 33-foot easement from all of them. The Zimmers and Mr. Brinkman were also involved in the previous, successful lawsuit against the Village, which allegedly created the ill will motivating the excessive easement demand. Whether the complaint alleges a class of one or of five is of no consequence because we conclude that the number of individuals in a class is immaterial for equal protection analysis.