Later courts went against this
Overruled in part by Dickerson v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance, 259 La. 763 (1971)
are of the opinion that writs should be granted and Humphreys v. Marquette, 235 La. 355, 103 So.2d 895 should be overruled insofar as it denies recovery to woman living with and dependent on deceased, but not married to him.
Overruled by Henderson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 354 So. 2d 1031 (1978)
In doing so, we overrule Humphreys v. Marquette Casualty Co., 235 La. 355, 103 So.2d 895 (1958), which held to the contrary.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Fontenot v. Town of Kinder, 377 So. 2d 554 (1980)
Defendants (the Town and Southern Farm), argue that Humphreys, supra, is inapposite because there the Supreme Court held the regular and borrowing employers to be solidarily liable whereas here the plaintiff worked for two separate employers during separate periods of the month, entitling him to receive workmen's compensation from each employer on the wages paid by each as provided by La.R.S. 23:1031, supra.
The opinion
McCALEB, Justice
(dissenting in part).
I concur in the rulings of the majority herein in all respects save one. Conceding the correctness of the conclusion that Holland and Humphreys were the borrowed employees of Martone, I do not believe that this circumstance relieves the insurer of the principal employer, Bon-Air Ranch, from liability for workmen’s compensation under our law. When these employees were performing personal services for Martone, manager of Bon-Air Ranch, the services rendered were incidental to their employment by Bon-Air Ranch and, hence, both it and Martone should be responsible, in solido.
That the regular employer of a borrowed employee is liable for workmen’s compensation for accidental injuries sustained by the borrowed employee, while engaged in performance of services for the borrowing employer, has heretofore been recognized by us in the leading case of Kern v. Southport Mill, 174 La. 432 , 141 So. 19 . To the same effect in principle is *385 Dobson v. Standard Accident Insurance Co., 228 La. 837 , 84 So.2d 210 and I perceive no reason why these authorities should not be applied here.
I therefore dissent from that part of the judgment which relieves American Casualty Company from liability.
On Rehearing of Nos. 43641 and 43662.