“The average man has little practical experience in investigating accidents, and testing and familiarizing himself with the various aspects of automobile accidents.”
How later courts described this case
- “The average man has little practical experience in investigating accidents, and testing and familiarizing himself with the various aspects of automobile accidents.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Hollingsworth v. Bovaird Supply Co., 465 So. 2d 311 (1985)
245 Miss. 487 , 148 So. 2d 693, 696 (1963) (Jones, J., dissenting) (“The average man has little practical experience in investigating accidents, and testing and familiarizing himself with the various aspects of automobile accidents.”), overruled on other grounds by Hollingsworth, 465 So. 2d 311
The opinion
Gillespie, J.,
specially concurring:
I concur in the holding that the testimony of Alvin Doyle, Jr., was not admissible. In this particular case I agree that his testimony invades the province of the jury, but I would reject it for the reason that the tes *494 timony with, reference to the respective speeds of the two vehicles and their angles and locations at the moment of impact, and one second before the impact, is so unreliable as to have no probative value. After reading this testimony, it is my considered opinion that the law should not allow the rights of litigants to hang by so tenuous a thread.
In general, I believe the law should always be ready to accept the aid of science in the search for truth, and it has been true that courts have probably been too slow in some instances to accept the findings of science. On the other hand, I am unwilling to accept a new way until it is proven to be reliable and a better method of finding facts than what it seeks to replace.
The witness came to Jackson and view the scene about a year after the accident. He viewed aerial photographs, photographs of the two vehicles, and examined one of the vehicles. He was told where the debris fell. From these he undertook to tell the jury the speed of one vehicle a second before the impact, the relative speeds of the vehicles at the time of impact, and the angle of the vehicles when they struck. He based all of his findings on the assumption that the heavier vehicle was diverted in its course by the impact with the Volkswagen. He had already assumed the angle at impact and eliminated the probability that the driver had a part in diverting the course of the panel truck. It appears that he assumed that the vehicles came together without either driver having’ made any attempt to swerve. This may have been true, but it is against all experience. These two vehicles were in charge of drivers who had the power to control them. This witness seems to assume it was a collision between two unmanned objects, the lighter Volkswagen and the heavier panel truck. He does not take into account the probabilities that the driver of the panel truck or the driver of the Volkswagen, or both, may have (1) skidded at an angle just before the *495 impact, or (2) turned the steering wheel to the right, or (3) turned the wheel to the left. All these other things could have a bearing on who got to the intersection first and who was traveling the fastest.
It is not valid to compare this witness with experts in the field of ballistics, fingerprints, and handwriting, for in all these fields the experts show to the trier of facts enlarged photographs that demonstrate beyond any question the validity of their science, and the facts upon which they base their conclusions. A juror or a judge can see for himself what the expert sees and on which he bases his conclusions. In reality, this witness reached his conclusions of fact on methods not explained to my satisfaction. He referred to kinetic forces, but did not explain any laws of motion. The average juror knows something of these laws, and if the juror is allowed to assume as many facts as the witness, his conclusions would probably be about as accurate.
When the time comes that such expert can demonstrate that he can reliably deduce the relative speed of two vehicles to a differential of five miles an hour, the angle of the vehicles at impact, and what diverted their courses, then such testimony ought to be admitted. Until then I think it best to keep the rules that time and experience have proven reliable. I do not want to belittle this witness on all counts. I am sure he could be a valuable aid in some cases. But in this case I am unable to place any confidence in his testimony. Therefore, I think it has no probative value and ought not to be admitted.
Some experts qualify their testimony by showing that they are members of recognized professions. All other so-called experts should not expect the courts to accept their findings until the witness is able to demonstrate that his science is reliable.
Lee, Kyle, and McElroy, JJ., join in this opinion.