overruling caselaw imposing the “impact requirement” and holding “that where a definite and objective physical injury is produced as a result of emotional distress proximately caused by defendant’s negligent conduct, the plaintiff in a properly pleaded and proved action may recover in damages for such physical consequences to himself notwithstanding the absence of any physical impact upon plaintiff at the time of the mental shock”
How later courts described this case
- overruling caselaw imposing the “impact requirement” and holding “that where a definite and objective physical injury is produced as a result of emotional distress proximately caused by defendant’s negligent conduct, the plaintiff in a properly pleaded and proved action may recover in damages for such physical consequences to himself notwithstanding the absence of any physical impact upon plaintiff at the time of the mental shock”
- recognizing that weight loss, inability to perform household duties, extreme nervousness, and irritability are facts from which jury could find physical injury
- applying zone of danger doctrine and also requiring that plaintiff suffer severe emotional distress with physical manifestations
- indicating that a plaintiff without physical injuries may recover for a defendant’s negligence through an “independent basis for tort liability”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Phillips v. Butterball Farms Co., 448 Mich. 239 (1995)
Daley is inapposite because Phillips states a claim for violation of public policy.
The opinion
Dethmers, J.
(concurring). I concur with and am signing the opinion of Mr. Justice Thomas M. Kavanagh in this cause, overruling the so-called “impact” rule in emotional distress cases heretofore followed by this Court.
I should like, however, to add a few words, in the interests of clarity, with respect to the retrospective effect of this decision.
This overruling decision is to be given retrospective effect, inasmuch as neither impairment of the obligations of contracts nor injurious affecting of vested rights, under earlier decisions, is involved. The overruled decisions, of course, remain the law of the ease with respect to the particular cases in which rendered. Donohue v. Russell (1933), 264 Mich 217 . As in Bricker v. Green (1946), 313 Mich 218 , this overruling decision applies to this case and to all “pending and future eases”. This does not limit the applicability of this decision to cases in which the cause of action accrues after the date of filing this decision, but includes all cases in which trial or appeal occurs after that date.
Black and T. G. Kavanagh, JJ., concurred with Dethmers, J.