stating that “independent of any Federal constitutional mandate, . . . both before and after commencement of the judicial phase of a prosecution, a suspect is entitled to be represented by counsel at a corporeal identification or a photographic identification”
How later courts described this case
- stating that “independent of any Federal constitutional mandate, . . . both before and after commencement of the judicial phase of a prosecution, a suspect is entitled to be represented by counsel at a corporeal identification or a photographic identification”
- adopting rule of evidence that United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 [1967], as to corporeal identifications, and People v. Anderson, supra, as to photographic showings, “shall govern the receipt in evidence of identification testimony where the witness has viewed or seen photographs of the suspect without regard to when the judicial phase of the prosecution is commenced” [footnotes omitted]
- requiring counsel at photo lineup and rejecting United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 93 S.Ct. 2568, 37 L.Ed.2d 619 (1973)
- "independent of any Federal constitutional mandate, . . . both before and after commencement of the judicial phase of a prosecution, a suspect is entitled to be represented by counsel at a corporeal identification or a photographic identification . . .”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by McDougall v. Schanz, 461 Mich. 15 (1999)
In People v. Jackson, the Michigan Supreme Court departed from Kirby; 391 Mich. 323, 217 N.W.2d 22, 27 (1974), overruled on other grounds by McDougall v. Schanz, 461 Mich. 15, 597 N.W.2d 148 (1999).
Overruled in part, on other grounds by People v. Hickman, 470 Mich. 602 (2004)
391 Mich 323, 336 (1974), overruled in part on other grounds by People v Hickman, 470 Mich 602
The opinion
Williams, J.
(concurring). My Brother Levin’s opinion is the right word at the right time, and I sign it without qualification.
Looking ahead with my Brothers T. G. Kavanagh, Swainson and Levin, I must agree that with the exception of conviction for perjury or some like crime there is neither logic nor warrant to introduce a defendant’s or a witness’s past conviction record for the purpose of impeaching his credibility, whatever other reason there may be for such admission.