concluding that evidence was insufficient to support reasonable suspicion when defendant was present in a high drug- trafficking area in the afternoon, defendant met briefly with another individual on sidewalk, and officer testified that in his experience drug transactions typically take place during brief meetings on the street in that neighborhood
How later courts described this case
- concluding that evidence was insufficient to support reasonable suspicion when defendant was present in a high drug- trafficking area in the afternoon, defendant met briefly with another individual on sidewalk, and officer testified that in his experience drug transactions typically take place during brief meetings on the street in that neighborhood
- holding that a brief contact with another person in a high-crime neighborhood was otherwise innocent behavior that large numbers of law-abiding citizens exhibit and therefore did not give rise to reasonable suspicion
- no reasonable suspicion that Young was engaged in criminal conduct when officer saw him engage in “short-term contact” with another man in an area known for drug trafficking
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DYKMAN, P.J.
(dissenting). This case is determined by the meaning of the words "reasonable suspicion," used in a constitutional sense in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). I conclude that the information Trooper Tennessen received provided him with a reasonable suspicion that Young possessed drugs. Thus, under Terry , Tennessen could stop Young to investigate further. The Supreme Court justified this lesser standard by noting that a stop was a limited intrusion. *434 Still, saying that if a police officer "reasonably suspects" illegal activity, he or she can conduct a Terry stop, does not define the quantum of evidence necessary for the stop.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that, for a higher burden, that of "probable cause," the evidence need not show that guilt is more likely than not. State v. Mitchell, 167 Wis. 2d 672, 681-82 , 482 N.W.2d 364, 367-68 (1992). This is instructive, because we are told that a person may be more likely to be innocent of wrongdoing than guilty, and yet an officer can have probable cause to search or arrest that person. And "reasonable suspicion" is a lesser standard than "probable cause." State v. Gordon, 159 Wis. 2d 335, 348 , 464 N.W.2d 91, 95 (Ct. App. 1990). All that is necessary is that the officer have more than a "hunch." See State v. Guy, 172 Wis. 2d 86, 95 , 492 N.W.2d 311, 314 (1992).
I conclude that Trooper Tennessen had the minimal amount of evidence necessary to stop Young. Young was in an area where purchasers and sellers of drugs congregated. Drugs were sold on the street. The trooper's understanding of the term "short-term contact," which Detective Gerfen used to describe Young's actions, was a short interaction between two people which in many instances in areas of high drug-trafficking involved the purchase of drugs.
Thus, what Trooper Tennessen heard was that Young had engaged in an act in a high drug-trafficking area which, in many instances, involved a drug purchase. It need not be more likely than not that Young purchased or sold drugs. Even if it was more likely than not that Young was innocent, Mitchell holds that this does not defeat the existence of probable cause, a higher standard than "reasonable suspicion." I conclude that Trooper Tennessen had something more *435 than a hunch that Young was involved in a drug purchase. Under this standard, Tennessen was permitted to stop Young to ask him questions. He did so, and Young replied with an incriminating statement. Given the standard of "reasonable suspicion," I conclude that Young's statement need not be suppressed. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.