The opinion
M. F. Cavanagh, J.
(dissenting). I dissent from the majority’s determination that reversible error *731 was committed. I am persuaded that mental anguish, as that term is utilized in MCL 750.520b(l)(f); MSA 28.788(2)(l)(f), takes on a much greater significance than just ordinary or normal after effects or upsets. To establish that this type of injury in fact occurred, psychiatric testimony might be appropriate.
The real question here was the probative value of the psychiatrist’s testimony. That was a matter of weight for the jury. It is true that the psychiatrist, by testifying to the victim’s veracity, buttressed her testimony that a rape in fact occurred. However, any such expert testimony would have to be premised upon the presumption of veracity. By this same token, that testimony would always invade the province of the jury to some extent.
I think the specific questions asked by the prosecutor in this instance were unnecessary and improper. The error, however, in my view, does not rise to a level warranting reversal. I would affirm.