The opinion
Danhof, C.J.
(dissenting). I am compelled to dissent from the majority’s decision because I believe the Supreme Court’s decision in Ed Zaagman, Inc v Kentwood, 406 Mich 137 ; 277 NW2d 475 (1979), requires a finding that all permissible uses under the zoning ordinance are inapplicable to the plaintiffs property before the ordinance may be found confiscatory. In Zaagman, supra, p 159 , the *461 Supreme Court analyzed an allegedly confiscatory zoning ordinance and stated that:
"Applying those rules enumerated in Part I discussing Kirk [v Tyrone Twp, 398 Mich 429 ; 247 NW2d 848 (1976)] it is clear that this matter is particularly governed by rule 3 of Kropf [v Sterling Heights, 391 Mich 139 ; 215 NW2d 179 (1974)], i.e., 'to sustain an attack on a zoning ordinance, an aggrieved property owner must show that if the ordinance is enforced the consequent restrictions on his property preclude its use for any purposes to which it is reasonably adapted’. It is, of course, plaintiffs’ duty 'to prove affirmatively that the ordinance is an arbitrary and unreasonable restriction upon the owner’s use of his property’ (Kropf, rule 2), as the 'ordinance comes to us clothed with every presumption of validity’ (Kropf, rule 1).”
The Court concluded that a review of the record supported the finding that "all reasonable uses are precluded under the R-l-C zoning designation”. Zaagman, supra, p 159 . Although the Court in Zaagman did not specifically address each use permitted under the R-l-C zoning classification, I interpret the above-quoted language to indicate that the other permissible uses were found to be inapplicable to plaintiff’s property as well. Under my interpretation of Zaagman, plaintiff failed to sustain its burden of proof that the zoning ordinance is confiscatory. I would affirm the trial court.