stating that reasonable people might conclude that the *589 defendant’s act of leaving his keys in an unlocked car, which was later stolen and involved in an accident, was “not too remote a cause of the plaintiffs injuries and that the joyrider’s intervention did not sever that causal connection”
How later courts described this case
- stating that reasonable people might conclude that the *589 defendant’s act of leaving his keys in an unlocked car, which was later stolen and involved in an accident, was “not too remote a cause of the plaintiffs injuries and that the joyrider’s intervention did not sever that causal connection”
- stating that reasonable persons might conclude that the defendant’s act of leaving his keys in an unlocked car, which was later stolen and involved in an accident, was “not too remote a cause of the plaintiffs injuries and that the joyrider’s intervention did not sever that causal connection”
- stating that reasonable people might conclude that the defendant's act of leaving his keys in an unlocked car, which was later stolen and involved in an accident, was "not too remote a cause of the plaintiff's injuries and that the joyrider's intervention did not sever that causal connection"
- finding that once negligence is found, “[t]he jury must then bridge the gap between the plaintiff’s injuries and the defendant’s negligence. This is the determination of cause and the remoteness of effect.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Kelly, J.
{dissenting). The Court of Appeals did not err when it denied plaintiffs’ application for delayed appeal on the ground that their application failed to meet the requirements of OCR 1963, 806.4 (2) and 803.3.
The appeal to this Court is dismissed as having been improvidently granted. Costs to defendants.
Dethmers, J., concurred with Kelly, J.