where a contract fixes the length of a servitude within the time allowed by law, “no question of prescription arises because the servitude would expire by the terms of the contract before it could ever be lost by the 10-year prescription for non-user”
How later courts described this case
- where a contract fixes the length of a servitude within the time allowed by law, “no question of prescription arises because the servitude would expire by the terms of the contract before it could ever be lost by the 10-year prescription for non-user”
- “Therefore, out of respect for, and as a courtesy to, that court, we proceed to [a decision], in the hope that our opinion will be of some assistance to the United States Supreme Court.”
- "If a servitude is established for 10 years or less, it will remain in force for the time so stipulated regardless of whether it is used by the servitude owner. In such a case no question of prescription arises....”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FOURNET, Chief Justice
(dissenting in part and concurring in part).
While I recognize that this litigation was instituted under the Louisiana Declaratory Judgments Act, Articles 1871-1883 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, pursuant to a directive of the United States Supreme Court, I cannot subscribe to the majority view that because of this fact we are called upon to render only an advisory opinion in this case and that, accordingly, “both the Louisiana district court and the Louisiana Court of Appeal went far beyond the directive of the TTnited States Supreme Court, as our courts were not asked to interpret or construe the reservation of the mineral rights in the deed to the United States.”
And while it is equally true that the federal courts may not choose to follow any decree we may render herein, although it is a generally accepted procedure for the federal courts to follow the decisions of the highest courts of the respective states in the interpretation of their laws where such decisions violate no provision of the United States constitution, I know of no authority or right this court has empowering it to render an “advisory” opinion under the Declaratory Judgments Act, as is being done by the majority here. In my humble opinion, not only is the authority of this court limited by the Louisiana constitution in such cases to a review of the decisions of the lower courts of this state, but the constitution also imposes an obligation and duty upon this court to review such cases in all of their aspects.
The fact that the case under consideration here was instituted because of the suggestion, or directive, to be found in the decision of the United States Supreme Court does not change the character of the declaratory judgments action, nor does it enlarge or decrease the prerogatives of this court under the circumstances any more than would be the case if bonding attorneys in a given case were to require a decision of this court on the question of the constitutionality of the issuing authority for such *945 bonds. The procedure would be identical to that in the instant case, as the action would have to be instituted in a district court of competent jurisdiction, and it could only reach this court (1) on appeal, in the event the act involved were to be found unconstitutional in the lower court; or (2) on a writ, as in the instant case, to review a judgment of an intermediary appellate court.
For the purpose of the record, however, I wish to state that I am of the view the majority opinion has properly construed the statute in question, its applicability, and its constitutionality. I am further of the view that the matter was properly resolved by the district judge, whose opinion is quoted in full by Mr. Justice HAMLIN in his dissent.