holding that the defendant “must affirmatively demonstrate that counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable and so prejudicial as to deprive him of a fair trial”
How later courts described this case
- holding that the defendant “must affirmatively demonstrate that counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable and so prejudicial as to deprive him of a fair trial”
- characterizing Brooks, 406 U.S. 605, 92 S.Ct. 1891, as an example of “the court or the state directly interfer[ing] with the attorney-client relationship by preventing counsel from rendering assistance” and describing the presumption of prejudice in such eases as a “prophylactic approach”
- noting that Cronic is properly applied “only in a ‘narrow spectrum’ of cases where the ‘circumstances . . . [were] so egregious that the defendant was in effect denied any meaningful assistance at all.’ ”
- recognizing that counsel is not required to “do what is impossible or unethical”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Cavanagh, J.
(dissenting). I concur with Chief Justice Mallett’s partial dissent in this matter. I write separately only to note my disagreement with my sister Boyle’s repetitive dicta about sentencing guidelines. Within the next year we will have the Legislature’s effort on sentencing guidelines, which should make my sister’s continuing declamation on the subject all the more pointless.
Weaver and Kelly, JJ., took no part in the decision of this case.