holding a “federal judgment” for the defendants on a civil rights claim 2 brought under § 1983 “collaterally estops plaintiffs from pursuing their wrongful death claim, 3 even on the theory that the officers’ preshooting conduct was negligent”
How later courts described this case
- holding a “federal judgment” for the defendants on a civil rights claim 2 brought under § 1983 “collaterally estops plaintiffs from pursuing their wrongful death claim, 3 even on the theory that the officers’ preshooting conduct was negligent”
- holding that prior ruling on Fourth Amendment excessive 25 force claim precludes separate claim for negligence because both require consideration of 26 whether arrest was reasonable under totality of circumstances
- holding that the standard of reasonableness applicable in a section 1983 action based on excessive force is the same as the standard of reasonableness applicable in a state law negligence action
- determining that no reasonable juror could find officer acted unreasonably in releasing dog but declining to address defendants’ claims that they owed no duty and were immune
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MORENO J., Concurring.
I agree with the majority that the Court of Appeal was correct that the federal judgment precluded plaintiffs from relitigating in the present state action whether defendants were negligent in their use of deadly force. Accordingly, I concur in part 1. of the majority opinion. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 512-517.)
I disagree with the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that this does not resolve the case because plaintiffs are entitled to amend their complaint to allege preshooting negligence. “ ‘Where the complaint is defective, “[i]n the furtherance of justice great liberality should be exercised in permitting a plaintiff to amend his complaint, and it ordinarily constitutes an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. [Citations.]” ’ [Citations.] This abuse of discretion is reviewable on appeal ‘even in the absence of a request for leave to amend’ [citation], and even if the plaintiff does not claim on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend. [Citation.]” (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 970-971 [9 Cal.R.ptr.2d 92, 831 P.2d 317 ].) “The burden of proving such reasonable possibility is squarely on the plaintiff.” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 718 , 703 P.2d 58 ].) “ ‘Plaintiff must show in what manner he can amend his complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of his pleading. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 375 , 556 P.2d 737 ].)
Plaintiffs did not attempt to amend their complaint in the superior court to allege preshooting negligence. The superior court in the present case did not *523 sustain the demurrer without leave to amend. The superior court held that the federal court judgment precluded plaintiffs from relitigating in state court whether defendants’ use of deadly force was reasonable, but overruled the demurrer because it concluded the federal judgment did not preclude plaintiffs from recovering on the theory that defendants failed to summon medical aid and prevented such aid from being administered. Rather than seek to amend their complaint to allege preshooting negligence, plaintiffs asked the superior court to strike their allegations regarding medical aid and enter a final judgment in favor of defendants.
The Court of Appeal initially concluded that plaintiffs’ allegation in their complaint in the present case that “ ‘[t]he shooting of [Hernandez] occurred as a result of the absence of due care for the safety of others’ ” “is sufficient to plead negligence on the part of the officers based on the theory their conduct leading up to the shooting, including the high-speed pursuit, foot chase, and release of a pursuit dog created an unreasonable risk of harm to themselves and Hernandez.” But the Court of Appeal later stated that it had “some doubt the plaintiffs’ complaint adequately pleads their pre-seizure negligence theory” and concluded “the appropriate disposition is to . . . remand the cause to permit the plaintiffs to file a ‘clean’ amended complaint alleging negligence based on their pre-seizure theory.”
The allegation in plaintiffs’ complaint that “ ‘[t]he shooting of [Hernandez] occurred as a result of the absence of due care for the safety of others’ ” cannot reasonably be read to allege that defendants engaged in preshooting negligence. Plaintiffs, therefore, never have alleged that defendants’ conduct prior to the shooting negligently created a situation in which it was reasonable to use deadly force. Despite the Court of Appeal’s invitation to amend the complaint to do so, plaintiffs have not shown in this court how they would amend the complaint to allege preshooting negligence. Accordingly, plaintiffs have not met their burden of proving that it is reasonably possible that they can amend their complaint to allege a cause of action for preshooting negligence.
In my view, we need say no more to resolve this case. We can and should wait for a case in which the plaintiff actually has alleged a cause of action for preshooting negligence to consider that cause of action.
Werdegar, 1, concurred.