The opinion
R. M. Maher, J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part). I cannot agree with the majority’s treatment of the trial court’s failure to excuse juror Kerr. Kerr, a nurse, knew a proposed defense witness and was to be a hospital’s principal defense witness in an upcoming malpractice action. Most significantly, however, the trial court’s "extensive voir dire” of juror Kerr revealed not that Kerr believed herself capable of deciding the case in an impartial manner but, rather, that she had preconceived notions which cast considerable doubt on her ability to remain impartial. Juror Kerr’s testimony showed that she would find it very difficult to return a verdict against the defendant physician unless she was convinced that he had deliberately inflicted harm upon plaintiffs.
In the course of the voir dire, in response to a question from defense counsel, Kerr indicated that she would find it difficult to return a verdict against defendant Dr. Berg:
"It might bother me in this respect, that I have reputable people that honestly tried. As this point I would question whether or not it was done deliberately.”
*268 Kerr never said that she considered herself capable of making a fair and impartial decision, but only that she would "honestly try” to do so. Clearly, Kerr was less than confident of her ability to set aside her personal views on malpractice, conceding only that she "would hope [she] could judge [the evidence] impartially and fairly”. (Emphasis supplied.)
GCR 1963, 511.4 provides in part:
"4. Challenges for Cause. After the examination of _ prospective jurors is completed and before any juror is ' sworn, the parties may challenge any juror for cause. Every challenge for cause shall be determined by the court. A juror challenged for cause may be directed to answer every question pertinent to the inquiry. The following are grounds for challenges for cause:
"(3) that the person is biased for or against a party or attorney;
"(4) that the person shows a state of mind which will prevent him from rendering a just verdict, or has formed a positive opinion on the facts of the case or as to what the outcome should be;
"(5) that the person has opinions or conscientious scruples which would improperly influence his verdict;
"(13) that the person is interested in a question like the issue to be tried.”
A careful review of the record reveals that Kerr (1) showed a state of mind which would prevent her from rendering a just verdict; (2) had opinions or conscientious scruples which would have improperly influenced her verdict; and (3) was interested in a question like the issue to be tried. The trial court was well aware that it was on shaky ground in denying plaintiff’s challenge for cause:
*269 "I don’t think I can excuse her for cause. I really don’t. I think it is about as tight a question as you can come to. I don’t think I can say that the woman is disqualified for cause.”
I am convinced that the trial court’s failure to excuse juror Kerr constituted an abuse of discretion. The majority warns trial courts to excuse such jurors in order to avoid reversal, and then, in the same breath, concludes that the trial court’s failure to do so does not mandate reversal.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial against all defendants except the police officers on the false imprisonment claim (however, I would order a new trial against the police officers on the other claims). I concur in the majority’s analysis of the remaining issues.