The opinion
on appellant’s motion for rehearing.
DAVIDSON, Judge.
Appellant again presses upon us her contention that the evidence touching her insanity was such as requires us to overturn the contrary conclusion of the jury and hold that she was insane. This we are unwilling to do.
While there is ample and sufficient evidence upon which the jury could have reached the conclusion that appellant was in *60 sane, there is also evidence sufficient to warrant the conclusion that she was sane at the time of the commission of the offense charged. Under such circumstances, the jury’s finding will not be disturbed.
In passing, it may be well to point out that in the cases of Ross v. State, 153 Tex. Cr. R. 312 , 220 S. W. 2d 137 , and McGee v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. Rep. 639, each carrying the death penalty, the defense of insanity was strongly presented by the facts, and we there applied the same rule as here followed.
Appellant again urges that the witness Cora Lee Jones should not have been permitted to testify that on October 6, 1949, the day of the killing, appellant knew it was wrong to kill a man. In connection with this contention, appellant argues that the witness had not seen the appellant or conversed with her for a period of six months prior to the time she fixed (October 6, 1949) as appellant’s knowing that it was wrong to kill a man, and therefore a sufficient predicate was not shown to authorize the testimony.
There is nothing in the bill of exception showing that appellant had not seen the witness for the six-month period mentioned.
As the objection appears in the bill, appellant was objecting to the witness expressing a general opinion that appellant knew it was wrong to kill a man. It was upon this theory that the matter was disposed of originally. The bill does not present for determination the question appellant now insists upon.
The record has again been reviewed, and we remain convinced that reversible error is not reflected.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.
Opinion approved by the court.