explaining that qualified prospective jurors “must be able, in a sense, to conceive both of a situation in which the minimum penalty would be appropriate and of a situation in which the maximum situation would be appropriate.” (citing Fuller v. State, 829 S.W.2d 191, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)), overruled on other grounds by Castillo v. State, 913 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)
How later courts described this case
- explaining that qualified prospective jurors “must be able, in a sense, to conceive both of a situation in which the minimum penalty would be appropriate and of a situation in which the maximum situation would be appropriate.” (citing Fuller v. State, 829 S.W.2d 191, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)), overruled on other grounds by Castillo v. State, 913 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)
- noting that both defendant and State may challenge for cause any juror who has a bias or prejudice against the law that either party is entitled to rely upon; stating that "[b]ias against the law is refusal to consider or apply the relevant law. It exists when a venireperson's beliefs or opinions 'would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and oath'"
- stating that bias against the law exists when a juror=s beliefs Awould prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties@
- stating that bias against the law exists when a juror’s beliefs “would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MeCORMICK, Presiding Judge,
concurring.
I concur only in the Court’s judgment for the reasons stated in my concurring and dissenting opinion in Johnson v. State, — S.W.2d -, 1998 WL 692441 (Tex.Cr.App. No. 0536-97, delivered October 7, 1998) (McCormick, P.J., concurring and dissenting). The Court’s opinion applies the rule stated in Smith v. State that jurors “must be able to consider the full range of punishment for the crime as defined by law.” Sadler v. State, 977 S.W.2d 140 (Tex.Cr.App., 1998); Smith v. State, 513 S.W.2d 823, 826 (Tex.Cr.App.1974).
However, Garrett v. State and other cases applying Garrett effectively have held jurors are not required to consider the full range of punishment for the raime as defined by law. See Garrett v. State, 851 S.W.2d 853, 860 (Tex.Cr.App.1993); see also Howard v. State, 941 S.W.2d 102, 126-30 (Tex.Cr.App.1996) (op. on reh’g); Zinger v. State, 932 S.W.2d 511, 513-14 (Tex.Cr.App.1996); Castillo v. State, 913 S.W.2d 529, 532-37 (Tex.Cr.App.1995); Johnson, — S.W.2d at -, 1998 WL 692441 (McCormick, P.J., concurring and dissenting). Therefore, in this case the Court should declare Smith to be another one of Garrett’s collateral casualties and simply hold that a party is not entitled to jurors who will consider the full range of punishment for the crime as defined by law. See Johnson, — S.W.2d at -, 1998 WL 692441 (McCormick, P.J., concurring and dissenting); Garrett, 851 S.W.2d at 861-64 (Campbell, J.) (discussing Garrett’s collateral casualties).
With these comments, I concur only in the Court’s judgment.