explaining that double-jeopardy provisions from United States Constitution and Texas Constitution “provide substantially identical protections”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that double-jeopardy provisions from United States Constitution and Texas Constitution “provide substantially identical protections”
- holding that the proper remedy after a finding of prosecutorial misconduct is a reversal of conviction and remand for new trial
- noting the Court’s long-standing precedent holding that the double-jeopardy provisions of both constitutions provide “substantially identical protections”
- reiterating “that the Texas and United States constitutions’ double jeopardy provisions provide substantially identical protections”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Criticized by John Hamilton Leib, Jr. v. State (2002)
and Mitchell have been criticized:
The opinion
BAIRD, Judge,
dissenting.
Our summary denial of applicant’s motion for rehearing wholly ignores the fact that our opinion on original submission failed to address four grounds for review which we agreed to consider.
On original submission, the majority stated we granted only two grounds for review. Ex Parte Mitchell, 977 S.W.2d 575, 576 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). And the concurring opinion states we granted review on only grounds one and two. Id., at 581 , n. 1 & 2 (Meyers, J., concurring). However, the records of the clerk of this Court indicate applicant’s petition for discretionary review which raised six grounds for review was granted without limitation on January 29, 1997. The case “shuck” indicates that all grounds for review were granted. Additionally, the parties briefed all six grounds for review.
When a motion for rehearing informs us that we failed to resolve grounds for review that we agreed to consider, we should not dismiss the motion. Instead, we should either address those grounds, explain why they need not be addressed, or dismiss them as improvidently granted.
Because the majority fails to do so, I dissent to the denial of appellant’s motion for rehearing.