holding that it was not error for the prosecution to state that, “I think there’s evidence beyond any reasonable doubt that the defendant did participate in the offense, that he’s the second person who raped [complaining witness]”
How later courts described this case
- holding that it was not error for the prosecution to state that, “I think there’s evidence beyond any reasonable doubt that the defendant did participate in the offense, that he’s the second person who raped [complaining witness]”
- overruling a similar ineffectiveness claim on the ground that the record did not reflect that the jury ever requested or received the judgment of conviction from which the prior conviction had not been deleted
- testimony “referring to or implying extraneous offenses 22 allegedly committed by the defendant” is rendered harmless if judge gives instruction to disregard
- trial court's instruction to disregard testimony of extraneous robbery would have cured any error
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DALLY, Judge,
concurring and dissenting opinion.
I concur in the result and believe the judgment should be affirmed; however, I do not agree with all of the language used. I dissent to the disposition of the appellant’s sixth ground of error. I do not believe that Article 37.07, V.A.C.C.P. requires the deletion from the information and judgment of the prior conviction language showing the appellant had been charged with theft of an automobile when he was convicted of the lesser included offense of unauthorized use of an automobile. The holding in Fairris v. State, 515 S.W.2d 921 (Tex.Cr.App.1974) is contrary to the holding of the majority in this ease; yet Fairris v. State, supra, is not overruled by the majority. I believe Fairris v. State, supra, is correct and the opinion here is incorrect.