noting that “the legislature has undoubtedly vested the attorney general with a broad discretion to decide when he may lend the assistance of his office to defend public officers.”
How later courts described this case
- noting that “the legislature has undoubtedly vested the attorney general with a broad discretion to decide when he may lend the assistance of his office to defend public officers.”
- “[A] private citizen . . . cannot maintain an action complaining of wrongful acts of public officials unless such private citizen avers special interest or a special injury not common to the public generally.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
LEWIS H. CONNER, Jr., Special Chief Justice.
DENIAL OF PETITION TO REHEAR
Appellants have filed a petition to rehear in this cause alleging five grounds. None of these grounds is meritorious. None present matters not previously considered by the court. It is not necessary or appropriate to again specifically refute in detail each ground. Substantively and procedurally plaintiffs have no cause of action. It is the law of this state that contests of nominations for public office determined within the political party apparatus are not decided in the courts. Taylor v. Tennessee State Democratic Executive Committee, 574 S.W.2d 716 (Tenn.1978). There is no subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Tennessee is de jure.
Counsel for appellants has likewise filed a motion to expunge that portion of the opinion headed “The Actions of Counsel for Plaintiffs.” He complains that the court should not have referred to statements made by him in his amicus curiae brief lodged in the office of the clerk of the court two days prior to oral argument in this matter. His complaint is based upon his recollection that the court had determined *52 not to allow the filing of that brief. Counsel is in error regarding the ruling of this court on that question. We determine not to consider the amicus curiae brief in deciding upon the merits of the appeal because of its late submission and the fact that the principal subject matter of the brief had no relevancy or materiality to the issues before the court. However, as judicial officers of this state, even though limited in tenure, we could not ignore the offensive content of the amicus curiae brief as well as other writings of counsel on file in this cause. The court has taken judicial notice of the invectives of counsel and under the clear authority of Ward v. Univ. of the South, 209 Tenn. 412 , 354 S.W.2d 246 (1962), it has dealt with them in what it deems an entirely appropriate manner.
The further contention of counsel that the opinion should be expunged because of lack of due process is equally without merit. There was no life, liberty or property deprived counsel by the holding of this court.
Following the precedent of Stewart v. Wakefield, 536 S.W.2d 327 (Tenn.1976), we did enjoin future participation by counsel in any additional court proceeding challenging the legality of the existing supreme court based upon the nominating procedure. We are satisfied that the injunction was both necessary and proper.
The petition for a rehearing is denied. The motion to expunge is likewise denied. The costs are taxed to the appellants.
E. BRUCE FOSTER, Jr., WALKER T. TIPTON, A. C. WHARTON, and JOYCE M. WARD, Special Justices, concur.