finding a contractual relationship between the retirement system at issue and the members of the system, and relying upon Hickey v. Pittsburgh Pension Board,106 A.2d 233 (1954), which held that the pensioner's rights became "vested" when he fulfilled the plan's service requirements
How later courts described this case
- finding a contractual relationship between the retirement system at issue and the members of the system, and relying upon Hickey v. Pittsburgh Pension Board,106 A.2d 233 (1954), which held that the pensioner's rights became "vested" when he fulfilled the plan's service requirements
- authorizing the board of trustees to "increase benefits for future or current retired members and beneficiaries. . . ."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
David Soloman, Special Justice dissenting. I respectfully dissent from the conclusions reached by the majority and would reverse the Pulaski County Circuit Court.
My reasoning does not require a distinction of the type of plan involved herein — contributory, non-contributory, mandatory, voluntary, or any other. Simply, my basis for dissent is the fact that any type of plan involving employees of the State of Arkansas has inherent in it the right and ability of the State to alter the plan prior to the recipient actually receiving benefits thereunder, or rather becoming entitled thereto based on the then existing law. Although we use the word “vesting”, and it might be the most appropriate, I do not think the member or recipient has reached this pinnacle until all the conditions have been achieved on his part under the then existing law. Up until this time the State of Arkansas acting through the legislative process can amend, alter and change the conditions under which the recipient participates — no “vesting”.
The distinction in my reasoning is that the governmental process has created a condition or contract, but implicit and a part thereof is that the State is not subject to the same rules as a private individual or private corporate entity. The philosophy of our government necessarily is that the future is subject to change, and that rigid processes must bend when the determination of such need is made by the appropriate governmental authorities. To me this is most true in the pension or retirement plans.
Admittedly there is a great conflict in the State and Federal Courts on this issue, and it is possible to reach most any conclusion and to find authority for this conclusion. The majority opinion has given attention to these many distinctions and conflicts. My reasoning is that since Appellee had not fulfilled all of the requirements on his part at the time the amendment to the plan became a law, he is governed by the law in effect when he had fulfilled all the requirements.
The Court in Creps v. Board of Firemens Relief and Retirement Fund, Trustees of Amarillo, Texas, 456 S.W. 2d 434 (1970) expressed my reasoning when it said:
“The firemen here had no vested property right in the pension fund that is necessary for the invocation of constitutional protection. Until the firemen, under the law, had a statutory right of refund or a right to receive a pension therefrom, their right in the fund was only an expectancy based upon, not only their continued employment for the required number of years, but also the continued existence of the law which is subject to revision, modification or complete abrogation by the Legislature.”
As stated I would reverse the lower Court and enter judgment for the Appellant.