Opinion

Cox v. Director of Revenue

  • 98 S.W.3d 548
  • 2003 Mo. LEXIS 32
  • 2003 WL 723288
Court
Supreme Court of Missouri
Filed
Mar 4, 2003
Status
Published
Author
Wolff
On the bench
Duane Benton
Cited by
65 cases

holding that although “actual physical control” used to be included as a means of committing driving while intoxicated in Missouri, the legislature has removed this phrase from the DWI statute, leaving only “driving” and “operating” as ways to commit the offense

How later courts described this case

  • holding that although “actual physical control” used to be included as a means of committing driving while intoxicated in Missouri, the legislature has removed this phrase from the DWI statute, leaving only “driving” and “operating” as ways to commit the offense
  • concluding that driver’s license was appropriately suspended for operating a vehicle where an individual was sitting behind the steering wheel in a parking lot with the key in the ignition and with the engine running
  • holding that police had probable cause to believe that defendant was operating his vehicle where defendant was found sleeping in the driver’s seat of his car with the key in the ignition and the engine running
  • holding that "cases interpreting the pre 1996 law[, such as Block and Liebhart,] should not be relied upon to define ‘operating’ because they do not separately define that term”

Written by the judges who cited it.

Distinguished

  • Distinguished by State v. Chambers, 2006 Mo. App. LEXIS 1554 (2006)

    Id. The present case is distinguishable from Cox in that even though Appellant was found slumped over the steering wheel of his vehicle with the keys in the ignition, both witnesses testified that they never observed the engine running.
    Missouri Court of AppealsOct 19, 2006Read it

The opinion

MICHAEL A. WOLFF, Judge,

dissenting.

This is a close case and I appreciate the principal opinion’s attempt to clarify the law as to what it means to operate a vehicle. But, on balance, I agree with Judge White’s analysis.

No one wants a person in Cox’s condition to drive. That means it should be lawful for him to get in his car, run the engine for heat or air-conditioning, and stay put. There is a risk to Cox of carbon monoxide poisoning when he opts to sleep in his ear with the engine running. But that hazard is to him only.

The hazard the legislative change appears intended to avoid is the danger to the public of an intoxicated person actually driving a car. The next time an intoxicated person such as Cox is moved to start a *553 car engine for comfort, perhaps he should then crawl into the back seat for his sobering slumber.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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