explaining the prohibition of spouses from suing each other as resting on the reasoning that, because husband and wife are a single unit, allowing spouses to sue would be tantamount to party suing himself or herself
How later courts described this case
- explaining the prohibition of spouses from suing each other as resting on the reasoning that, because husband and wife are a single unit, allowing spouses to sue would be tantamount to party suing himself or herself
- holding that wife, claiming intentional tort by husband when he allegedly shot her, was not barred by inter-spousal immunity doctrine from bringing a tort action against husband
- Rule abrogated as to intentional torts
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DONNELLY, Judge,
dissenting.
In Ebel v. Ferguson, 478 S.W.2d 334, 336 (Mo. banc 1972), the following statement was made: “V.A.M.S. 1.010, by adopting the common law, implants in Missouri the common law concept that a wrongful act between spouses does not give rise to a cause of action.”
I have come to believe that such statement is erroneous because it cannot be said with certainty that interspousal immunity was a part of the common law prior to the year 1607. See Osborne v. Purdome, 244 S.W.2d 1005, 1011 (Mo. banc 1951).
Therefore, I do not argue that this Court is without power to abrogate interspousal immunity in Missouri. I do argue that the power should be exercised with some evidence of restraint. I merely submit that the question of abolishing interspousal immunity should be decided by the people or by their elected representatives and not by this Court,
i respectfully dissent.