decision under prior act finding that claimant’s activity triggering subsequent complication must be “unreasonable under the circumstances” to be an independent intervening cause
How later courts described this case
- decision under prior act finding that claimant’s activity triggering subsequent complication must be “unreasonable under the circumstances” to be an independent intervening cause
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Lawson Cloninger, Judge, dissenting. I respectfully dissent from the majority decision in this case. Moss v. El Dorado Drilling Co., 237 Ark. 80 , 371 S.W.2d 528 (1963), citing from 1 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 13.00, specifically states:
When the primary injury is shown to have arisen out of and in the course of an employment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause attributable to claimant’s own negligence or misconduct. (Emphasis added)
From a reading of this rule, it is my opinion that an independent intervening cause can only defeat a claim which is otherwise compensable if it is caused by the claimant’s own negligence or misconduct. This rule still requires that in order to be compensable, it must be a “natural consequence that flows from the injury.”
In Aluminum Co. of America v. Williams, 232 Ark. 216 , 335 S.W.2d 315 (1960), the Arkansas Supreme Court again cited the rule stated above from Larson’s treatise. The majority opinion emphasizes the fact that although the court reversed a finding by the Circuit Court that a second surgical procedure was made necessary because of an independent intervening cause, the opinion made no reference to any requirement of negligence or fault on the claimant’s part. However, the court did cite the rule from Larson’s treatise which, in its fact, seems clear. Further, it is intereting to note that in that opinion, the Supreme Court cited testimony of the claimant that the incident occurred when he arose from a chair at his home. The court also made note of the fact that the claimant had been doing some painting during the week in question but that he had not done anything that would have hurt his back.
For the above stated reasons, I would reverse the finding of the Commission that claimant’s injury was not com-pensable. The claimant in this case was not engaged in any activity which could be considered negligence or misconduct, and the evidence clearly indicates that the subsequent episode “flowed from the original injury.”