holding that in civil cases, “a motion for extension of time is necessarily implied” when appellant, acting in good faith, files notice of appeal beyond time permitted by Rule 26.1, but within fifteen-day period in which appellant would be entitled to move to extend filing deadline under Rule 26.3
How later courts described this case
- holding that in civil cases, “a motion for extension of time is necessarily implied” when appellant, acting in good faith, files notice of appeal beyond time permitted by Rule 26.1, but within fifteen-day period in which appellant would be entitled to move to extend filing deadline under Rule 26.3
- stating that a timely notice of appeal is necessary to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction and that, after the period for granting a motion for extension of time under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.3 has passed, a party can no longer invoke the appellate court’s jurisdiction
- explaining that for civil cases “a motion for extension of time is necessarily implied when an appellant acting in good faith” files notice of appeal “within the fifteen-day period in which the appellant would be entitled to move to extend the filing deadline”
- holding that “a motion for extension of time is necessarily implied when an appellant acting in good faith” files notice of appeal “within the fifteen-day period in which the appellant would be entitled to move to extend the filing deadline”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by In re J.A., 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 5522 (2001)
However, because we conclude Verburgt is distinguishable, it is inapplicable to the instant appeal.
The opinion
BAKER, Justice,
dissenting.
The court of appeals reached the decision required by applying the plain and unambiguous language of Rule 41(a)(2). See Tex. R.App. P. 41(a)(1) and (2); Davies v. Massey, 561 S.W.2d 799, 801 (Tex.1978); Glidden Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 155 Tex. 591 , 291 S.W.2d 315, 318 (1956); see also Miller v. Miller, 848 S.W.2d 344, 345 (Tex.App. —Texarkana 1993, no writ); El Paso Sharky’s Billiard Parlor, Inc. v. Amparan, 831 S.W.2d 3, 5 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1992, writ denied).
The Court’s opinion dispenses with Rule 41(a)(2)’s requirements, and amends the rule by judicial fiat. The Court’s opinion is contrary to its own precedent. See State Dept. of Highways & Public Transportation v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d 235, 241 (Tex.1992)( “[W]e do not revise our rules by opinion.”); Alvarado v. Farah Mfg. Co., 830 S.W.2d 911, 915 (Tex.1992)(same). I would deny the writ 1 . Because the Court decides otherwise, I dissent.
. I also dissent to Verburgt’s companion cases. See Boyd v. American Indem. Co., 958 S.W.2d 379 (Tex.1997); Harlan v. Howe State Bank, 958 S.W.2d 380 (Tex.1997); Holmes v. Home State County Ins., 958 S.W.2d 381 (Tex.1997).