trial court erroneously excluded evidence that a complainant in another criminal proceeding had erroneously identified defendant as the perpetrator and later identified as the perpetrator an inmate serving five life sentences who had also confessed to the offense with which defendant was charged in this case
How later courts described this case
- trial court erroneously excluded evidence that a complainant in another criminal proceeding had erroneously identified defendant as the perpetrator and later identified as the perpetrator an inmate serving five life sentences who had also confessed to the offense with which defendant was charged in this case
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DISSENTING OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
DOUGLAS, Judge.
The majority denies leave to file the State’s motion for rehearing without written opinion. It holds that the refusal to admit the proffered testimony of Boyd concerning an unrelated offense at a remote time and at a different place is reversible error. It does so apparently on the question of identity or mistaken identity of appellant by the prosecutrix even though Boyd did not testify in the present case.
Boyd was present at a lineup in Dallas and the substance of his testimony would have been that Jackson, appellant, was possibly the man who committed a robbery and rape near Marshall. Lewis, in his trial at Marshall, could have cross-examined Boyd about this on the question of mistaken identity. But what relevance does it have in the present case as to whether the prosecu-trix and her roommate could identify Jackson as the rapist? The majority is allowing the admission of evidence concerning an extraneous offense of another defendant in a separate case.
In admitting extraneous offenses offered by the State on the question of identity to rebut the defense of alibi, the majority requires that there must be similarities as to how the offenses were committed and that they were committed by the defendant before they are admitted. The similarities are not present in the case at hand.
Would the majority hold on the question of identification where alibi has been raised as it has been in this case that the evidence that an offense was committed some 150 miles away by someone who possibly looked like an accused to be admissible? A good rule of evidence works both ways. What would be the relevancy of such evidence in the example given? It would be just as relevant as the proffered testimony the majority uses to reverse this case.
What happens in another case against another defendant is not admissible. There is no showing why it should be admissible in this case.
The motion for rehearing should be granted and the judgment should be affirmed.
ONION, P. J., joins in this dissent.