holding that “an indictment charging one offense during the Brief of Appellee Victoria County Criminal District Attorney No. 13-14-00750-CR 10 commission of another crime need not allege the elements of the later offense.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that “an indictment charging one offense during the Brief of Appellee Victoria County Criminal District Attorney No. 13-14-00750-CR 10 commission of another crime need not allege the elements of the later offense.”
- holding that to have granted the motion for an expert as presented and at the time filed would have constituted a real threat to the trial court’s control of the proceeding
- holding that “an indictment charging one offense during the commission of another crime need not allege the elements of the later offense.”
- trial court did not err by refusing to grant motion to quash capital murder indictment which did not allege elements of underlying felony offense of robbery
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
ODOM, Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the decision to grant the state’s motion for rehearing on the basis of records that were not before this Court on original consideration of this appeal, but which have now been presented by supplemental records, regarding appellant’s failure to pursue his right to a defensive psychological expert witness in a timely and diligent fashion. By addressing that issue in those terms, however, the majority has not departed from its fundamental holding on original submission, in which this Court recognized the right of an indigent capital murder defendant to the appointment of an expert witness on the future conduct issue of Article 37.071, V.A.C.C.P. That right was acknowledged to rest on these considerations:
Those who face an accusation of being likely to commit criminal acts of violence that will constitute a continuing threat to society face a peculiarly unique charge with ominous consequences. In this jurisdiction the use of the expert opinion testimony of those in the behavioral sciences has frequently been resorted to by the prosecution, and this Court has consistently approved such use, often basing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a death-producing verdict on that evidence. See, e. g., Franklin v. State (5/24/78, # 57,348); Chambers v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 568 S.W.2d 313 (1978); Hughes v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 562 S.W.2d 857 ; Shippy v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 556 S.W.2d 246 ; Granviel v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 552 S.W.2d 107 ; Battie v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 551 S.W.2d 401 ; Collins v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 548 S.W.2d 368 ; Moore v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 542 S.W.2d 664 ; Livingston v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 542 S.W.2d 655 ; Gholson and Boss v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 542 S.W.2d 395 ; Smith v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 540 S.W.2d 693 . Given the role such evidence has come to play, the unique character of the issue, the extreme consequences that rest on resolution of the issue, and the tremendous diversity of opinions on such matters within the field of experts that may qualify to give such evidence on the issue, it cannot be denied that for accused persons facing the possibility of death, expert behavioral witnesses for the defense are necessities, not luxuries.
If the scales of justice are to weigh equal regardless of wealth; if the hand of justice is to extend as far to those who cannot afford to hire an expert as to those who can; if the State is not to have exclusive access to experts; if the jury is to hear “all possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate it must determine,” Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 , 96 S.Ct. 2950 , 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976), and not hear only those experts of the prosecutorial persuasion; if fairness and open inquiry are to characterize the judicial exploration of the accused’s mental condition and possible future conduct: then the indigent capital murder defendant must have equal access to psychological or psychiatric expert opinion testimony from some expert of his rea *721 sonable choosing, but not necessarily his first choice.
I concur.
ROBERTS and PHILLIPS, JJ., join in this concurrence.