regarding the jury as the conscience of the community when imposing the death sentence for murder
How later courts described this case
- regarding the jury as the conscience of the community when imposing the death sentence for murder
- stating that in order to justify punitive damages “there must be first a finding of failure to exercise reasonable care”
- specifying that punitive damages in tort claims should be reserved for misconduct that is “outrageous, because of the defendant’s evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others”
- where gross negligence is used as the basis for punitive damages, “there must be first a finding of failure to exercise reasonable care, and then an additional finding that this negligence was accompanied by “wanton or reckless disregard for the lives, safety or property of others,” an “element not distinguishable from malice implied from the facts.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Horn v. Hancock, 1985 Ky. App. LEXIS 641 (1985)
However, after carefully examining the Horton case and the record in the case at bar, we find the two are distinguishable.
The opinion
VANCE, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Historically, punitive damages have been allowable in Kentucky for tortious conduct that is willful, malicious, and without justification. Shields’ Adm’rs v. Rowland, 151 Ky. 136 , 151 S.W. 408 (1912). Malice may be implied from outrageous conduct as long as the conduct is sufficient to evidence conscious wrongdoing. Hensley v. Paul Miller Ford, Inc., Ky., 508 S.W.2d 759 (1974).
Conduct which evidences conscious wrongdoing in my mind is limited to either (1) intentional wrongdoing, or (2) conduct which is so inherently dangerous to the lives and safety of others that the actor is bound to have known and recognized the likelihood of such harm but nevertheless engaged in the conduct without regard for its consequences.
I think the same standard should be applied to negligent conduct which can be said to justify punitive damages. It should be so inherently dangerous to the lives and safety of others as to warrant the conclusion that if the actor did not actually intend the injury that flowed from his conduct, he must necessarily have recognized the danger of such harm, and notwithstanding the danger, have engaged in the conduct without regard for its consequences.
I do not find in the evidence in this case any evidence that the employee who first answered the service call was aware of the danger. He thought the gas had entered the house through a chimney. He thought the kitchen exhaust fan would remove any gas from the house. He thought that closing the damper in the fireplace would prevent further gas from entering the house. He did not think the situation was dangerous. Even though he may have been mistaken in these matters, there is nothing to suggest he intended to cause injury, that his actions were malicious, or that the circumstances were such that he must have known, but just didn’t care, about the danger to others. In my view, this employee was entitled to a directed verdict on the issue of punitive damages.
The same is true of the employees who were called to repair the leak in the gas line near the driveway. The majority opinion states that evidence justified a belief that the employees were aware that gas had escaped into the house, was probably still there, and still leaking into the house. I do not find such evidence in the record. Admittedly, one employee was aware that some gas had leaked into the house. He took measures which he thought would prevent further gas from entering the house and would expel that which had already entered. I find no evidence that he, or any other employees, knew that gas was still in the house and still leaking into the house some two hours later when the explosion occurred.
Rather than a case of proceeding ahead while aware of the danger without regard for the lives and safety of others, it seems to me this was a case of proceeding ahead entirely oblivious of any danger to the lives and safety of others.
I agree with Justice STEPHENSON that the testimony of Ernest Murphy was not relevant. He had devised a plan for training company employees. The company had its own plan. No law or regulation required the use of Murphy’s plan, and it is pure speculation to assume that the accident would not have happened if the com *393 pany had put into effect the plan devised by Murphy.
I would affirm the award of compensatory damages and reverse the award of punitive damages.