discussing the trial court’s ability to control and limit the length of voir dire proceedings
How later courts described this case
- discussing the trial court’s ability to control and limit the length of voir dire proceedings
- stating that unnecessarily repetitious questions reveal an attempt to prolong voir dire
- holding that a one hour limitation was an abuse of discretion
- requiring that appellate court consider whether party was prevented from examining juror who actually served on panel
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
TEAGUE, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
The majority opinion for the Court correctly holds that the trial judge in this cause, at the outset of the voir dire examination of the jury panel, erroneously restricted counsel for appellant’s voir dire examination by imposing an unreasonable time limitation in which counsel had to conduct his voir dire examination of the jury panel.
The reason I write is to once again plead with a majority of this Court to expressly overrule Barrett v. State, 516 S.W.2d 181 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), 1 which decision of this Court is the obvious source why the trial judge in this cause expressly imposed an unreasonable time limitation on counsel for appellant’s voir dire examination of the jury panel.
To allow Barrett v. State, supra, to continue to remain a valid declaration of law by this Court, namely, that the trial judge is authorized by law to set and cause the attorney for the accused to adhere to an arbitrary time limit in which counsel, or, if pro se, the defendant himself, must complete his voir dire examination within the arbitrarily imposed time limitation, is to perpetuate the game of oneupmanship. This, to me, causes the voir dire examination not to become the time when counsel for the accused makes the intelligent determination whether a prospective juror should be challenged for cause, or be stricken without cause, but, instead, is the time to see whether he can outplay the trial judge in the game of oneupmanship.
In this instance, counsel for appellant “won” the game, in the sense that he has achieved a reversal for his client. But, isn’t it judicial ridiculousness for this Court to now hold that the appellant is entitled to a new trial — because his trial counsel bested the trial judge in a game of oneupmanship, which game, but for this Court’s decision of Barrett v. State, supra, would probably never have been played in the first place in this cause.
Because Barrett v. State, supra, expressly perpetuates the game of oneupmanship, which I do not believe has any place in our system of criminal jurisprudence, I must respectfully dissent to the majority’s continued refusal to expressly overrule Barrett v. State, supra.
McCORMICK, J., joins.
. See my comments in the dissenting opinion I filed in Whitaker v. State, 653 S.W.2d 781 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (Teague, J., dissenting opinion).