holding that we require the trial court to first consider whether such evidence, although relevant, creates a danger of unfair prejudice, and then to determine whether the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value
How later courts described this case
- holding that we require the trial court to first consider whether such evidence, although relevant, creates a danger of unfair prejudice, and then to determine whether the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value
- holding submission of a verdict form containing improper sentencing standard not waived because the error concerned a matter “essential to the jury’s imposition of the death penalty itself’ and the error was not cured by subsequent juror polling
- explaining that any overlap between statutes does not create a vagueness problem because constitutionally required narrowing is performed at the penalty phase
- "Even the most gruesome photographs may be admissible if they 22 tend to shed light on any issue, to corroborate testimony, or if they are essential in proving a necessary element of a case, are useful to enable a 23 witness to testify more effectively, or enable the jury to better understand 24 [the] testimony. Other acceptable purposes are to show the condition of the victims' bodies, the probable type or location of the injuries, and the 25 position in which the bodies were discovered." (internal citation omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
David Newbern, Justice, concurring. The majority opinion is correct in every respect, and I join in the opinion. I write separately only to point out my concern about the manner of Spanish-English translation displayed in the record. It is important that the testimony of a witness who does not speak English be taken as closely as possible to the way in which any other witness’s testimony would be taken. There should be questions and answers to and from the witness, not to and from the interpreter. The person asking the question should ask it of the witness. The interpreter should do no more than translate the question. In translating the witness’s answer, the interpreter should do no more than say what was spoken by the witness but say it in English; in other words, translate the testimony directly.
In this case, the record shows there were instances when the Court or other person asking questions of the witness would say something like, “Ask him . . . ,” the witness would speak, and then the interpreter would say, “He says . . . .” Obviously that turns the interpreter into a witness rather than a translator. An example of this sort of thing appears in Szklaruk v. Szklaruk, 251 Ark. 599 , 473 S.W.2d 599 (1971). There, as here, no issue was made of the matter, but the objectionable practice of conversing with the interpreter, rather than conversing with the witness through the interpreter, is displayed.
In Kay v. State, 260 Ark. 681 , 543 S.W.2d 479 (1976), we at least suggested, if we did not make it clear, that the job of an interpreter is simply to repeat the question asked of the witness in the language understood by the witness, and then to repeat the witness’s answer in English. The interpreter is not to make “remarks.”
Again, no issue has been raised in this case concerning the interpreter and the practice foEowed. From the record before us, however, I have a concern whether Mr. Camargo’s testimony was accurately stimulated by the questions asked of him and accurately recorded through the interpreter.
Another non-issue in this case I regard as one that could have been serious is whether Mr. Camargo knew what other witnesses and court personnel were saying to each other during the trial. An accused’s right to presence at the trial is of little value if he or she cannot understand the proceedings.
If a person with limited or nonexistent skiEs in the English langage is to have a fair trial, or a fair resentencing procedure, great care must be taken in the direct translation process.