McCraw v. Maris

CORNYN, Justice,

dissenting.

Uniformity in the application of our rules of evidence is important to our jurisprudence to the end that each case should be adjudicated according to the same rules of admissibility. This is but one meaningful way of guaranteeing that justice is administered equally under the law. Because the majority opinion seeks a result rather than fidelity to a uniform, result-neutral application of the rules of evidence by which cases must be tried, I dissent. Furthermore, I join JUSTICE GONZALEZ in objecting to the peculiar fashion in which the court chooses to decide only one of the issues raised in this appeal, leaving the parties, the bench and the bar without a clue as to the proper resolution of the dispute over the omitted issues and their application on retrial.

The Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Act (FEGLIA) provides in pertinent part:

(a) The amount of group life insurance and group accidental death insurance in force on'an employee at the date of his death shall be paid, on the establishment of a valid claim, to the person or persons surviving at the date of this death, in the following order of precedence:

First, to the beneficiary or beneficiaries designated by the employee in a signed and witnessed writing received before death in the employing of-fice_ For this purpose, a designation, change, or cancellation of beneficiary in a will or other document not so executed and filed has no force or effect.

Second, if there is not designated beneficiary, to the widow or widower of the employee.

*761 5 U.S.C.A. § 8705 (a) (West 1967 & Supp.1991) (emphasis supplied). Without any explanation, the majority omits any discussion of the very statute upon which the proper disposition of this case turns.

In 1966 Congress amended the PEGLIA to its present wording to legislatively overrule a number of decisions by the federal circuit courts of appeal that had eroded the harsh effect of the literal working of the statute, focusing on the “manifest intention of the insured.” Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Manning, 568 F.2d 922, 925 (2d Cir.1977), quoting United States v. Pahmer, 238 F.2d 431, 433 (2d Cir.1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1026 , 77 S.Ct. 592 , 1 L.Ed.2d 597 (1957). The 1966 amendment established “an inflexible rule that a beneficiary must be named strictly in accordance with the statute irrespective of the equities in a particular case.” Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Manning, 568 F.2d at 925-26 .

It should go without saying that we “must follow the clear language of the statute.” RepublicBank Dallas, N.A. v. Interkal, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Tex.1985). This is true even though a judge may disdain the particular result. See In re Dublin’s Estate, 244 S.W.2d 242, 244 (Tex.1952). Moreover, this is not a situation where Congress acquiesced to the courts’ expansive construction of the statute’s coverage. Congress plainly sought to limit the manner in which beneficiaries could be designated, presumably to prevent just what is happening here: expensive and time-consuming litigation over the benefactor’s intent.

The controlling issue in this dispute is: Was the designation of change of beneficiary form filed in accordance with the FEGLIA? It is the majority’s failure to identify and focus on this controlling fact issue that starts it down the path to error.

Under our rules of evidence, one of the first hurdles to admissibility is a showing of relevance. Tex.R.Civ.Evid. 401. The majority completely leapfrogs relevance— the requirement that there must be “some logical connection, either directly or by inference, between the fact offered and the fact to be proved.” Pittman v. Baladez, 158 Tex. 372 , 312 S.W.2d 210, 216 (Tex.1958). “ ‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Tex.R.Civ.Evid. 401 (emphasis supplied). Although the original Rule 401 included a specific test for materiality, the current rule subsumes materiality in the test for relevance by requiring that the proffered evidence relate to a “fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.” See WENDORF, SCHULUETER & BARTON, TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL, Article IV. Relevancy and its Limits (3d ed. 1991). In this case, the issue of fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action is whether the change of designation of beneficiary was filed, not whether a handwritten duplicate beneficiary designation form existed, as the majority holds. Evidence of the existence of a duplicate designation of beneficiary form in the handwriting of Donna Ann Maris is not admissible because it does not have any tendency to make the alleged fact of filing more or less probable. As such, the trial court correctly excluded this evidence.

Petitioners argue that the district judge, as the trier of fact, could have inferred the ultimate fact from the offered evidence. An inference is merely a deduction from the facts proved. Joske v. Irvine, 91 Tex. 574 , 44 S.W. 1059 (1898). Although an ultimate fact may be proved by circumstantial evidence, such a finding must be based on inferences fairly drawn from the facts in evidence and not on surmise or speculation. See Briones v. Livine’s Dept. Store, 446 S.W.2d 7, 10 (Tex.1969); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Krayer, 366 S.W.2d 779, 780 (Tex.1963). More to the point here, however, “[wjhen circumstances are consistent with either of ... two facts and nothing shows that one is more probable than the other, neither fact may be inferred.” Litton Indus. Products, Inc. v. Gammage, 668 S.W.2d 319, 324 (Tex.1984) (citing Texas Sling Co. v. Emanuel, 431 S.W.2d 538 *762 (Tex.1968) and Continental Casualty Co. v. Fountain, 257 S.W.2d 338 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1953, writ ref’d)). Here, there is no logical relationship between the offered evidence and the claimed conclusion. It does not follow that because she filled out a duplicate beneficiary designation form in her own handwriting that she, in fact, prepared and filed an original form any more than it may be inferred that although she intended to do so, she did not file it. See generally Cadena, The Pyramiding of Presumptions and Inferences in Texas, 4 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1 (Spring 1972).

Even if the majority is impelled to the conclusion that exclusion of this evidence was error, Petitioners have not met their burden to show any error was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause rendition of an improper judgment. Tex. R.App.P. 81(b)(1). The excluded evidence of the duplicate beneficiary designation form is cumulative of other evidence admitted on this point and, thus, even erroneous exclusion is harmless error. Rose v. O’Keefe, 39 S.W.2d 877, 879 (Tex.Comm’n App.1931, opinion adopted); Thrailkill v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 670 S.W.2d 382, 387 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref d n.r.e.). Certainly, the inferences which petitioners seek to have drawn from the excluded evidence are cumulative of the inferences that they sought to have drawn from the evidence admitted and considered by the trial court. Moreover, how the majority can hold that in this non-jury trial— where the trier of fact actually heard all the evidence, both admitted and excluded, albeit on a bill of exception — that admission would have probably resulted in a different judgment is beyond me. I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.