explaining that suspect is in custody when he is physically deprived of freedom, when he is told that he cannot leave by law-enforcement personnel, when law-enforcement personnel create situation in which reasonable person would believe that his freedom of movement has been restricted, and when law-enforcement officials “manifest[ ] to the suspect” that probable cause to arrest exists but do not tell suspect that he is free to leave under circumstances that would lead reasonable person to believe that he is under restraint in manner similar to arrest
How later courts described this case
- explaining that suspect is in custody when he is physically deprived of freedom, when he is told that he cannot leave by law-enforcement personnel, when law-enforcement personnel create situation in which reasonable person would believe that his freedom of movement has been restricted, and when law-enforcement officials “manifest[ ] to the suspect” that probable cause to arrest exists but do not tell suspect that he is free to leave under circumstances that would lead reasonable person to believe that he is under restraint in manner similar to arrest
- stating Texas courts recognize four general situations which may constitute custody: (1) when the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way; (2) when a law enforcement officer tells the suspect he cannot leave; (3) when law enforcement officials create a situation that would lead a reasonable person to believe that his freedom of movement has been significantly restricted; and (4) when there is probable cause to arrest and law enforcement officers do not tell the suspect he is free to leave
- concluding that “custody” can be established by showing that “there is probable cause to arrest and law enforcement officers do not tell the suspect that he is free to leave[,]” but noting that “the officers’ knowledge of probable cause [must] be manifested to the suspect” and the manifestation, combined with other circumstances, must be sufficient to “lead a reasonable person to believe that he is under restraint to the degree associated with an arrest”
- holding appellant’s admission that he was present during murders, in light of earlier evasions and inconsistencies, established probable cause to arrest appellant for murder even though appellant did not admit to committing offense: ―[w]hile appellant did not admit to committing the offenses, his admission that he was present during the murders was incriminating, and a reasonable person would have realized the incriminating nature of the admission.‖
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by James Franklin Brown v. State (2005)
questioning in Dowthitt are distinguishable.
The opinion
MALONEY, Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the disposition of points of error six and seven, and otherwise join the opinion of the Court. In his sixth point of error, appellant complains that he did not receive adequate warnings pursuant to Tex. Code Grim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.22, § 3 prior to making his videotaped oral statements. In resolving this point, the majority discusses whether § 3 requires warnings to be given by the individual “to whom the statement is made.” This epistle is unnecessary to the disposition of this point of error for two reasons. First, as the majority notes in footnote six, the record supports the trial court’s finding that appellant’s polygraph examination and Hidalgo’s questioning of. appellant constituted a single, continuous interrogation. In view of this finding, the warnings administered prior to the polygraph examination, a fact which is undisputed, also extended to the videotaped oral statements. Second, appellant does not argue in his brief that his statement was taken in violation of § 3 because the warnings were not given by the individual “to whom the statement is made.” Review of the statement of facts reveal that such an objection was lacking in the trial court as well. I would overrule this point of error by concluding that the record supports the trial court’s finding that the warnings appellant received prior to the polygraph examination extended to Hidalgo’s interview of appellant.
In point of error seven, appellant alleges that his videotaped oral statements and his third written statement were taken in violation of Texas law because they were the products of an illegal warrantless arrest. I agree with the majority’s determination that the arrest was illegal. I further agree with the majority that the error was harmless. In addition to holding the error harmless, however, the majority finds that appellant’s statements were admissible because “the taint between the arrest and appellant’s custodial statements [was] sufficiently attenuated.” Majority op. at 262. Discussion of the attenuation doctrine is unnecessary because appellant’s incriminating statement was made before the illegal arrest. Nonetheless, the majority relies upon Bell v. State, 724 S.W.2d 780 , 788 n. 4, for the proposition that “a custodial confession may sometimes be motivated by a precustodial event, ...,” which in this case was appellant’s preeustodial admission to being present at the murder scene. Majority op. at 262. The majority’s reliance on Bell is unpersuasive. The statement in Bell is a quote from Justice Stevens’ concurring opinion in Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 220 , 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2260-2261 , 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979) in the context of a discussion of the vagaries of the “temporal proximity” factor. Bell, 724 S.W.2d at 788 . The only place this language is found in our caselaw appears in footnote four in Bell addressing the same issue.
For the foregoing reasons, I concur only with points of error six and seven, and otherwise join the opinion of the Court.