holding that although the “defendant as principal actor” was the theory best supported by the evidence, trial court did not err in submitting parties instruction because defendant attempted to develop theory that other actor committed crime and sufficient evidence was presented to allow jury to infer defendant acted as party to crime committed by second actor
How later courts described this case
- holding that although the “defendant as principal actor” was the theory best supported by the evidence, trial court did not err in submitting parties instruction because defendant attempted to develop theory that other actor committed crime and sufficient evidence was presented to allow jury to infer defendant acted as party to crime committed by second actor
- holding that evidence of victim's homosexuality, offered under assumption that jury would consider a homosexual a less valuable member of society, was not relevant to appellant's background, character, or the circumstances of the crime and was, therefore, inadmissible during punishment in capital murder trial
- finding party instruction appropriate even though primary actor theory was best supported by the evidence because appellant repeatedly attempted to put forth evidence showing that a non-defendant party had committed or masterminded the crime
- ruling that the homosexuality of the victim, if unknown to the defendant and unrelated to the crime, is irrelevant to the jury’s ability to consider and give mitiga-ing effect to the background or character of the defendant
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MANSFIELD, Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the result. With respect to appellant’s point of error number twenty, it is my opinion that the testimony of the director of the rehabilitation program at Star House where the complainant was employed at the time of his death was not victim impact evidence as contemplated by the Supreme Court in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 , 111 S.Ct. 2597 , 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). The testimony — which was brief — was that the complainant had done well in a state hospital drug rehabilitation program which was why the director considered him as a good candidate for the internship program at Star House. There was no testimony as to the complainant’s character or that he was a “good person.” Accordingly, the State “did not open the door” to evidence of the complainant’s bad character, i.e. his prior convictions.
*560 With respect to appellants point of error number twenty-two, it is my opinion that the sexual preference of the victim in a capital murder trial is irrelevant and thus inadmissible if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the defendant did not know the sexual preference of the victim. The victim’s sexual preference would only be relevant, and admissible as such, if it is shown by the defendant, at the guilt-innocence phase, that the victim’s sexual preference was a significant factor in his defense. Such a determination should be made by the trial court outside the presence of the jury. See Nelson v. State, 848 S.W.2d 126 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), ce rt. denied, 510 U.S. 830 , 114 S.Ct. 100 , 126 L.Ed.2d 66 (1993).