holding that trial court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over declaratory judgment suit that seeks to determine potential tort liability because exercising jurisdiction will deprive real plaintiff of traditional right to choose time and place of suit
How later courts described this case
- holding that trial court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over declaratory judgment suit that seeks to determine potential tort liability because exercising jurisdiction will deprive real plaintiff of traditional right to choose time and place of suit
- holding that the trial court had jurisdiction over a declaratory judg ment action but should have declined to exercise it because it deprived a prospective tort plaintiff of the right to determine whether to file suit and if so when and where
- holding that the trial court should have declined jurisdiction in declaratory action to avoid depriving “real plaintiff of traditional right to choose time and place of suit”
- stating that mandamus to compel the granting of pleas in abatement is generally limited to those instances where one court has interfered with the jurisdiction of another
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated on other grounds by In Re Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 47 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1104 (2004)
695 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. 1985) (orig. proceeding), abrogated on other grounds by In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 124
Distinguished
Distinguished by in Re Foremost County Mutual Insurance Co. and Jim Doland (2005)
But both Allstate and Abor are distinguishable.
The opinion
ROBERTSON, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The declaratory judgment act expressly provides for uniformity of interpretation:
This Act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those States which enact it, and to harmonize, as far as possible, with federal laws and regulations on the subject of declaratory judgments and decrees.
Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 2524-1, § 15.
The Court acknowledges that it is a uniform act and plainly states: “The majority of jurisdictions addressing the specific question have held that a trial court should not exercise jurisdiction over a suit for declaration of non-liability by a potential negligence defendant.” 695 S.W.2d at 566. In light of the ample authority discussed in the majority opinion, I would hold that the trial court clearly abused its discretion in denying Abor’s plea in abatement. E.g., Cunningham Brothers, Inc. v. Bail, 407 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 959 , 89 S.Ct. 2100 , 23 L.Ed.2d 745 (1969); K.M.S. Research Laboratories v. Willingham, 629 S.W.2d 173 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1982, no writ); Howlett v. Scott, 69 Ill.2d 135 , 13 Ill.Dec. 9 , 370 *568 N.E.2d 1036 (1977). By exercising jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment action, the trial court is depriving plaintiff Abor of the traditional right to choose the time and place of suit.
This Court has jurisdiction to grant mandamus relief for a clear abuse of discretion. State Bar of Texas v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d 829, 834 (Tex.1980). Accordingly, I would grant the writ of mandamus and order the Bell County District Court to' abate the action and to defer to the pending action in Harris County.
HILL, C.J., joins in this dissenting opinion.