explaining that if “an arrest or detention is executed under process which is legally sufficient in form and duly issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, an action for false imprisonment will not lie”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that if “an arrest or detention is executed under process which is legally sufficient in form and duly issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, an action for false imprisonment will not lie”
- explaining that if Aan arrest or detention is executed under process which is legally sufficient in form and duly issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, an action for false imprisonment will not lie@
- finding that a witness’s report to a judge was absolutely privileged and that a letter to an attorney was similarly privileged because it was written in contemplation of a judicial proceeding
- stating that communications made during the course of judicial proceedings Awill not serve as the basis of a civil action for libel or slander@
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Connor v. Waltrip, 1990 Tex. App. LEXIS 1797 (1990)
” We further distinguish James because, in that case, the propriety of the diagnosis did not involve whether the medical standards were applied at the time of the diagnosis.
Distinguished by Bruce v. Byrne-Stevens & Associates Engineers, Inc., 113 Wash. 2d 123 (1989)
Therefore, James is distinguishable from the present case, where there is no such preempting statute.
The opinion
WALLACE, Justice,
dissenting.
I concur in the majority’s decision concerning James’ cause of action for malpractice, but respectfully dissent as to their decision that the summary judgment rendered was proper as to the possibly libelous nature of Dr. Rosenthal’s letter diagnosis to Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Texas.
I would hold that the trial court’s summary judgment was improper in light of the fact that on at least three occasions James pointed out the existence of this letter to the trial court. They are:
1. “Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant, Michael R. Rosenthal, M.D., Motion for Summary Judgment”;
2. “Plaintiff’s First Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment”; and
3. “Plaintiff’s First Supplemental Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.”
Each of these times James specifically pointed out that Dr. Rosenthal had written to Blue Shield stating that Mrs. James was suffering from a condition of paranoid psychosis. These facts set out a cause of action for libel, and show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Further, in his deposition that was before the trial court, Rosenthal admitted to writing this letter.
Admittedly, James never specifically pointed out the existence of this letter within the context of her libel cause of action, but used this letter to show the inconsistency of the defendant’s diagnosis. However, the demands of Rule 166-A, Tex.R.Civ.Pro. and its interpretation in City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Authority, 589 S.W.2d 671 (Tex.1979), directly places the burden on the movant in a motion for summary judgment. Within the Clear Creek decision, this Court stated:
[Sjummary judgments must stand on their own merits, and the non-movant’s failure to answer or respond cannot supply by default the summary judgment proof necessary to establish the movant’s right.
Id. at 678 .
James as the non-movant did present the trial court with the facts that state a cause of action for libel. I would hold that James has preserved her cause of action based on the fact that the movant defendant Rosen-thal did not meet his burden under Rule 166-A.
SPEARS, J., joins in this dissent.