holding that defendants’ affidavits and deposition testimony negated actual malice where plaintiff “presented no controverting proof that [the defendants] believed that the statements in question were false or published with reckless disregard for the truth”
How later courts described this case
- holding that defendants’ affidavits and deposition testimony negated actual malice where plaintiff “presented no controverting proof that [the defendants] believed that the statements in question were false or published with reckless disregard for the truth”
- stating that affidavits of defendants in which they stated that they never had any doubts and certainly no serious doubts about the truth of the statements they made were sufficient to support a summary judgment when no controverting proof was submitted
- holding that when trial court's order granting summary judgment does not specify ground or grounds relied upon for its ruling, summary judgment will be affirmed on appeal if any of theories advanced are meritorious
- holding that, by contrast to false statements of fact injurious to reputation, all assertions of opinion are protected by First Amendment of United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 8 of Texas Constitution
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
RAY, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent in this cause for the same reason as expressed in my dissenting opinion delivered today in Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551 (Tex.1989). As in Casso , I feel that if the majority insists on overturning established Texas summary judgment law, the very least it could do is to remand for a new trial in the interest of justice.