Opinion

Cates v. State

  • 776 S.W.2d 170
  • 1989 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 126
  • 1989 WL 59560
Court
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
Filed
Jun 7, 1989
Status
Published
Author
Campbell
On the bench
Duncan, Teague, Campbell, Davis, White
Cited by
39 cases
Authority
More cited than 8.2%

holding that the evidence gathered by a CPS worker was instrumental to the defendant’s arrest for child abuse

How later courts described this case

  • holding that the evidence gathered by a CPS worker was instrumental to the defendant’s arrest for child abuse
  • Miranda applicable to questioning of defendant in jail by investigator for Dep't of Human Resources for although "she did not have the power to arrest, she was acting as an agent of law enforcement," due to her "responsibility to discover child abuse and report it"
  • incarcerated defendant’s unwarned child abuse confession made to social services worker inadmissible in light of court’s determination that social worker was acting as agent of law enforcement
  • CPS worker will be categorized as an agent of law enforcement if the record establishes "that when the [defendant] made the admissions, the DHR employee was utilizing her capacity so as to accomplish what the police could not have lawfully accomplished themselves"

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

CAMPBELL, Judge,

concurring.

I wholeheartedly agree with the majority treatment of the core issue in this case. The facts in the instant case are clearly distinguishable from those in Paez v. State, 681 S.W.2d 34 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). As has been stated by an author with some considerable knowledge of Anglo-American jurisprudence:

“The prior decided case stands only for a point actually necessary to the judgment. Anything else in the opinion is dictum. Even if the rule carefully laid down would lead to the decision in the case and was unmistakably meant to, the case is still ‘distinguishable’ if you can distinguish it on either the facts or the issue.” Llewellyn, Commercial Transactions, pp. 16-17 (1946).”

I write solely for the purpose of examining the other “concurring” opinion in this case. What is it that Judge Teague “concurs” in? What legal principle or principles contained in the majority opinion are embraced by his “concurring” opinion? Does he find the Paez decision distinguishable from that in the instant case? No, indeed! Does Judge Teague conclude that the holding in Paez governs the disposition of the instant case? Yes indeed, he does! In fact Judge Teague concludes that the record clearly supports the Court of Appeals in its conclusion, “and under Paez the statements should have been admissible evidence.” Teague, J., Concurring, slip op. at 7. And yet the majority opinion finds that appellant’s statements were inadmissible. Does this portend that Judge Teague finds comfort in Presiding Judge McCormick’s Dissenting Opinion? Nay, nay! Methinks Judge Teague finds succor (along with the appellant) in the concluding paragraph of the majority opinion. With these comments, I join the majority opinion.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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