stating that the court was “reluctant to afford greater constitutional protection to members of the print and broadcast media than to ordinary citizens” and therefore holding that when a public figure sues a private individual, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant made false and defamatory statements about the plaintiff with actual malice
How later courts described this case
- stating that the court was “reluctant to afford greater constitutional protection to members of the print and broadcast media than to ordinary citizens” and therefore holding that when a public figure sues a private individual, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant made false and defamatory statements about the plaintiff with actual malice
- stating that a summary judgment may be granted on the basis of uncontroverted testimonial evidence of an interested witness if that evidence “is clear, positive and direct, otherwise credible and free from contradictions and inconsistencies, and could have been readily controverted” (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c))
- noting that constitutional implications in defamation claims do not alter our summary judgment standards
- asserting that “if the non-movant must, in all likelihood, come for the with independent evidence to prevail, then summary judgment may well be proper in the absence of such controverting proof’
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
RAY, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority today ignores stare decisis and needlessly overrules the court’s recent decisions in Bessent and Beaumont Enterprise. Bessent v. Times-Herald Printing Co., 709 S.W.2d 635 (Tex.1986); Beaumont Enter *567 prise & Journal v. Smith, 687 S.W.2d 729 (Tex.1985). While stare decisis should remain a flexible doctrine, I see no compelling reason to overturn established Texas summary judgment law.
Even if the majority feels it must overrule Bessent and Beaumont Enterprise, the very least it could do would be to remand for a new trial in the interest of justice pursuant to rule 180 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. Mayor Brand justifiably relied on our opinions in Bessent and Beaumont Enterprise. He should not be punished for failing to divine the court’s future development of the law.