holding that—even though defendant had admitted to police that kidnapped child was already dead—trial court could compel defense counsel to produce map identifying the location of the child’s body created by defendant for her attorneys because attorney-client privilege must yield to policy interests behind ethical rule requiring disclosure of confidential communications necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury of another person
How later courts described this case
- holding that—even though defendant had admitted to police that kidnapped child was already dead—trial court could compel defense counsel to produce map identifying the location of the child’s body created by defendant for her attorneys because attorney-client privilege must yield to policy interests behind ethical rule requiring disclosure of confidential communications necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury of another person
- reviewing question of inappropriate statements under both state statutory and federal constitutional standards and ultimately using its resolution of the question under the state standard for inducement to also answer the federal question of voluntariness
- rejecting defendant’s claim that court must apply strict scrutiny to legislative classifi- cation governing eligibility for death penalty and applying rational basis test to statute
- privileges derived from rulemaking power given to this Court to replace legislatively drafted statutes
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Robinson v. State, 2000 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 43 (2000)
Id. Henderson is readily distinguishable from the case at bar.
The opinion
McCORMICK, Presiding Judge,
concurring.
In points of error nine and ten, appellant claims Tex.Pen.Cd., Section 19.03(a)(8), violates equal protection principles. I agree with the majority that these points should be overruled but for different reasons than those advanced by the majority.
I would dispose of these points of error by holding that no state or federal equal protection questions are presented because “similarly situated” individuals (i.e, all those who intentionally or knowingly murder a child under the age of six) are treated the same. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. -,- -, 117 S.Ct. 2293, 2297-2298 , 138 L.Ed.2d 834, 841 (1997) (Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause creates no substantive rights; instead, it embodies a general rule that States must treat like eases alike but may treat unlike cases accordingly); Ex parte Davis, 947 S.W.2d 216, 228 (Tex.Cr.App.1996) (McCormick, P.J., concurring, joined by White, J., Meyers, J., Keller, J., and Mansfield, J.) (when all similarly situated capital murder defendants are treated the same, there simply is no colorable equal protection claim), citing Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 363 (Tex.Cr.App.1995) (Clinton, J., dissenting). Because Section 19.03(a)(8) makes no “classifications” or “distinctions” between “similarly situated” individuals, then it is unnecessary to take the equal protection analysis to the next step of determining whether a “fundamental right” or a “suspect” class is involved. See Vacco , 521 U.S. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 2297-2298 , 138 L.Ed.2d at 841 (if a legislative classification or distinction “ ‘neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class,’” the federal judiciary will uphold it “ ‘so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end’ ”).
Somewhat intertwined with appellant’s equal protection claim is a due process claim. Section 19.03(a)(8) does not violate Due Process principles because individuals possess no “liberty interest” to murder children under the age of six. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. -,-, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 2267-2268 , 138 L.Ed.2d 772, 787 (1997) (Courts should exercise restraint in expand *569 ing the concept of substantive due process “lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy preferences of the members of this Court”).
Based on the foregoing, I do not believe the judiciary has any power to subject Section 19.03(a)(8) to any level of judicial “scrutiny” on equal protection or due process grounds. See Vacco , 521 U.S. at-, 117 S.Ct. at 2297-2298, 138 L.Ed.2d at 841; Glucksberg , 521 U.S. at-, 117 S.Ct. at 2267-2268, 138 L.Ed.2d at 787. Texas citizens without any interference from the judiciary have the power to make all those who kill children under the age of six subject to the death penalty.
With these comments, I concur only in the result the majority reaches in disposing of appellant’s points of error nine and ten. I otherwise join the Court’s opinion.