defendant entitled to summary judgment on claim for intentional interference with prospective advantage where plaintiff "has cited no authority in support of this cause of action, nor even any to show that such a tort is recognized in Tennessee"
How later courts described this case
- defendant entitled to summary judgment on claim for intentional interference with prospective advantage where plaintiff "has cited no authority in support of this cause of action, nor even any to show that such a tort is recognized in Tennessee"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
TODD, Judge,
concurring.
Although the majority opinion mentions my views on the impropriety of the actions alleged in the May 30, 1974, article, I am disappointed that my colleagues are unwilling to join me in unequivocally condemning actions prohibited by the prescribed ethical standards for the bench and bar.
The Code of Professional Responsibility adopted by the American Bar Association and by the Supreme Court of this State prior to May, 1974, provides:
“D.R. 8-103, Lawyer Candidate for Political Office. A lawyer who is a candidate for judicial office shall comply with the applicable provisions of Canon 7 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.”
The Code of Judicial Conduct promulgated by the American Bar Association states:
“B. Campaign Conduct. (1) A candidate . . . for judicial office . . . ”
(c) should not make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of his office.”
The article of May 30, 1974, charged plaintiff with violating the provisions just quoted.
The import of the article was not merely that plaintiff offered a promise of “support” for a candidate for Attorney General. Due to the fact that the Attorney General was to be elected by the members of the Supreme Court, the promise of “support” by necessary inference included the promise of the vote of plaintiff as a sitting justice of the Supreme Court.
I cannot agree that the violation of the quoted provision of the Code of Judicial Conduct is permissible activity for a judicial candidate “in the context of the politics surrounding major party nominations.” Such conduct is prohibited, wrong, and disgraceful. It is proper grounds for discipline of a lawyer and removal of a judge for misconduct. This Court should not condone it as permissible.
Such conduct being as previously characterized, the imputation of such conduct is of necessity libelous.
I challenge this Court and the Supreme Court to declare in ringing and decisive tones that, regardless of the method of selecting judges, the prescribed standards of professional and judicial conduct are mandatory at all times and that there is no holiday from them during an election season.
Nevertheless, I am willing to accept the conclusion of the majority regarding the article of May 30, 1974, on the ground that the record fails to disclose any grounds of malice, knowledge of falsity, or reckless disregard of truth.
As to the May 31, 1974, article, I concur fully with the majority opinion.