determining that retroactive application of the Court's decision turned "primarily on the extent of public reliance on the former rule and the ability to foresee a coming change in the law"
How later courts described this case
- determining that retroactive application of the Court's decision turned "primarily on the extent of public reliance on the former rule and the ability to foresee a coming change in the law"
- observing that “fear of excessive verdicts is not a sufficient justification” for denying noneconomic damages because “[t]he judicial system has adequate safeguards to prevent recovery of damages based on sympathy or prejudice rather than fair and just compensation for the plaintiff’s injuries”
- stating that the Court should, “in light of present social realities,” reconsider policy and “act in response to the needs of a modern society”
- recognizing that parents may recover damages for loss of “love, advice, comfort, companionship and society” resulting from child’s wrongful death
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Disagreed with by Air Florida, Inc. v. Zondler, 1984 Tex. App. LEXIS 6927 (1984)
We disagree with Air Florida’s contention that a special rationale concerning minor children animated the Sanchez decision.
Limited by Moore v. Lillebo, 674 S.W.2d 474 (1984)
Although the court limited its holding in Sanchez to a minor child, Article 4671, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann., applies to “an injury causing the death of any person” and permits recovery of damages for the wrongful death of an adult child.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Garrard v. St. Elizabeth Hospital, 1986 Tex. App. LEXIS 12969 (1986)
The appellees argue that Sanchez is distinguishable because of the death involved and their argument would carry over to Baptist Hospital.
The opinion
RAY, Justice,
concurring.
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
I concur with the majority in overruling the Schindlers’ motion for rehearing. I further concur with the majority of the Court in rejecting the pecuniary loss limitation in actions for the wrongful death of a child. In doing so, we join the modern trend in allowing recovery for loss of companionship, society, emotional support, love and felicity.
The opinion speaks only to recovery by a parent for the death of a minor child. Legal symmetry mandates that the class of beneficiaries affected by this decision not be limited to parents of minor children. The majority has aptly noted that “injuries to the familial relationship are significant injuries and are worthy of compensation.” In future cases brought under the Texas Wrongful Death Act, I would permit recovery for the social losses and emotional injuries inflicted upon any beneficiary designated by statute. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 4675.
We have permitted Mrs. Sanchez to recover damages for mental anguish, recognizing that “[a] plaintiff should be permitted to prove the damage resulting from a tortfeasor’s negligent infliction of emotional trauma.” Mrs. Sanchez introduced evidence that she is suffering from traumatic depressive neurosis and as a result must seek medical care for physical pains associated with her neurosis. While the majority opinion does not address the issue, I do not believe that proof of such physical manifestations should be a necessary predicate for recovery for mental anguish. Connell v. Steel Haulers, Inc., 455 F.2d 688, 691 (8th Cir.1972).
Mr. Chief Justice Pope, in his dissent to the majority opinion, states that “[s]ome of that language in the opinion suggests that any mental anguish, however slight, is com-pensable.” While I agree with his observa *259 tion, I disagree with his objection. The focus should be on compensating the bereaved for their harrowing experience resulting from the untimely, preventable and otherwise unnecessary death of one with whom they have shared a special emotional relationship. See 1 Speiser, Recovery for Wrongful Death 2d, § 3:52. To this extent, I would overrule such cases as Speier v. Webster College, 616 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex.1981); Brown v. American Transfer & Storage Co., 601 S.W.2d 931, 939 (Tex.1980); and Harned v. E-Z Finance Co., 151 Tex. 641 , 254 S.W.2d 81 (1953). Justice and public policy should permit an award for the grief, sorrow and mental distress suffered by a decedent’s survivors. See Scoville v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 458 F.2d 639, 649 (8th Cir.1972); Connell v. Steel Haulers, Inc., 455 F.2d at 691 ; see also, 1 & 2 Speiser, supra, §§ 3:53, 15:11.
The concurring opinion in Bedgood v. Ma-dalin, 600 S.W.2d 773, 776-80 (Tex.1980) (Spears, J.), was the harbinger of the present majority opinion. Mr. Justice Spears concluded his concurrence by stating: “It is time for Texas to take this step into the 20th Century.” The majority has initiated that step; we should now complete the evolution.
KILGARLIN, J., joins in this concurring opinion.