The opinion
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
BELCHER, Judge.
The appellant re-urges his ground of error number one: That he did not have notice of the certified exhibits introduced by the state during the hearing on punishment as required by Sec. 3 of Art. 3731a, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St.
The state’s attorney testified that he orally informed appellant’s counsel at a previous setting of this case on September 25, 1967, that he had the packets of the appellant’s prior convictions in his files, including an assault to murder conviction in Bowie County. On October 30, 1967, state’s counsel again advised appellant’s counsel that he had all the packets of the prior convictions of the appellant; that he opened and exhibited the files and turned through them; and that appellant’s counsel never asked to see them or gave any indication that he was desirous of looking at said records.
Appellant’s counsel testified that the instruments in question had never been exhibited or offered to him; that he had seen them when state’s counsel opened his file and turned through them, and he had no idea what the instruments contained until they were offered in evidence; that state’s counsel exhibited a packet of papers to him and said that they were some of appellant’s other convictions.
The appellant’s counsel was appointed on May 22, 1967, and there were two settings passed for appellant before the one on September 25. Trial was had beginning on October 21, 1967.
Art. 37.07, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P., puts every accused on notice that the state may show his prior criminal record, if any. Such statute does not limit or restrict in any way the method of showing such prior criminal record. The records of prior convictions not alleged for enhancement are not automatically admissible under the provisions of Art. 3731a, supra. Ordinarily, the method of doing so has been the use of certified copies of the prison records together with the comparison of a known print of the accused by a qualified fingerprint examiner. In order for the record evidence to be admissible, the offeror must meet the requirements of Section 3 of Article 3731a, supra, unless in the opinion of the trial court the accused was not unduly surprised when the state introduced the certified copies of the prior convictions. Denham v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 428 S.W.2d 814 ; Smith v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 439 S.W.2d 834 .
The trial court held a separate and extended hearing on the outside of the pres *924 ence of the jury relating to the admissibility of the certified exhibits offered in evidence by the state to show the prior criminal record of the appellant. The examination of the fifty-page hearing reveals that counsel for appellant was acquainted with and had personal knowledge of much of the contents of the written instruments making up the exhibits. He pointed out to the trial court many claimed defects in the instruments contained in the exhibits and urged his objections thereto.
At the close of the hearing, the trial court resolved the issues raised as to the admissibility of the records when he announced that he was ruling that the exhibits were admissible in evidence. This ruling, from the record as a whole, appears to be a sufficient determination by the trial court that the appellant was not unduly surprised when the state introduced the certified copies of the prior conviction.
Ground of error number one does not present reversible error.
The appellant contends that this Court erred in not reversing this conviction for the reasons urged in his grounds of error number five, failure to charge on circumstantial evidence; numbers six and seven, failure to charge on aggravated and simple assault; and numbers eight and nine, the insufficiency of the evidence to show specific intent to kill and to show malice.
The evidence reflects that the assaulted party and his wife, and his brother, Elzie Watkins and his wife, entered a tavern, and took seats in a booth about twelve or fifteen feet from the front door, with the assaulted party and his wife sitting with their backs to the door while Elzie and his wife were sitting facing the door.
Elzie Watkins testified in part as follows:
“Q All right, I will ask you if you saw him (appellant) when he came in the door?
“A I saw him walk in the door.
“Q All right, after you saw him walk in the door what did you hear or see next?
“A I heard the gunshot first.
“Q All right, and after you heard a gunshot what did you see, if anything ?
“A I saw him standing in the doorway with a gun in his hand.
“Q All right, after you saw this man in the doorway with a gun in his hand I will ask you if you saw anything unusual about the booth your brother was sitting in?
“A I saw cotton fly — when the gun went off I saw cotton fly out of the booth.
“Q I will ask you if your brother said or did anything after you saw the cotton fly in the booth he was sitting in?
“A He said, ‘Oh, I am shot.’
“Q And what did he do then, if anything ?
“A He slumped over against his wife.
“Q And then I will ask you if the man with the gun in his hand did anything?
“A He come and stuck the gun in my face.
“Q All right. Will you show us where he stuck the gun?
“A Up between my eyes (indicating).
“Q All right. Just up sort of between your eyes, then?
“A Yes.
“Q I will ask you whether or not he said anything to you?
“A He said, ‘You are next.’
“Q Did he say anything else to you when he said that?
*925 “A He said, ‘You are next, m-
The further testimony of Elzie Watkins reveals that while the gun was pointed at his face he grabbed the appellant’s wrist or hand, pushed him back against the door, and fell with and on top of the appellant to the floor where he (Elzie) was shot in the back of the head. Elzie then took the gun away from the appellant, and the appellant left the room.
On cross-examination Elzie Watkins testified as follows:
“A He (appellant) just walked in and shot like, right toward my brother’s back.
“Q Did he—that is what I am asking, did he seem to aim it?
“A He aimed it.
“Q Where were you? How far were you from the defendant at this time ?
“A I was 12 to 15 feet.”
The testimony is sufficient to warrant the conclusion that the above grounds of error do not call for a reversal.
The tenth ground of error will be considered for it has now been determined that appellant did timely and properly reserve his exception to the court’s failure to define the terms “intentionally” and “voluntarily” in his charge to the jury.
It is concluded that such definitions were not necessary, same being words of commonly accepted meaning and readily understandable. 4 Branch 2d 659, Sec. 2307; Joubert v. State, 136 Tex.Cr.R. 219 , 124 S.W.2d 368 ; Cave v. State, 161 Tex.Cr.R. 107 , 274 S.W.2d 839 .
The twelfth ground of error which was not considered on original submission is re-urged: In it appellant contends that the trial court committed error in refusing his request to retire the jury prior to the offer by the state of some 36 exhibits in their presence, six of which were later not admitted into evidence.
To support his position the appellant reasons in his brief that: “this request was refused and the State offered some 36 separate numbered exhibits; the jury was retired and Appellant made lengthy objections; six exhibits were not admitted; the jury was returned and allowed to receive some 30 exhibits without any knowledge of the contents of the six not admitted; the jury returned a maximam verdict.”
No objections were made to the admission of any of the exhibits in the presence of the jury. In the absence of any showing that the jury at any time knew how many exhibits were originally offered or knew the nature of the matter contained in the six not admitted, no error is perceived. The twelfth ground of error is overruled.
The complaint as to the admission in evidence of the fingerprint cards is overruled for the reasons shown by the disposition of ground of error number one.
The contention that his fingerprints were illegally taken during the trial and used at the penalty stage to prove prior convictions does not reveal error. McKenzie v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 450 S.W.2d 67 .
Grounds of error numbers two, three, and four pertaining to comments of the trial court and the refusal of testimony about appellant’s appearance after the shooting which were reviewed in the original opinion have been reconsidered in the light of the motion for rehearing and it is concluded that they do not present error.
Appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.